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ANTHONY J. COLANGELO

ABSTRACT

This Article offers a coherent way of thinking about double jeopardy
rules among sovereigns. Its theory has strong explanatory power for
current double jeopardy law and practice in both U.S. federal and
internationallegal systems, recommends adjustments to double jeopardy
doctrine in both systems, and sharpens normative assessment of that
doctrine.
The Article develops a jurisdictionaltheory of double jeopardy under
which sovereignty signifies independent jurisdiction to make and apply
law. Using this theory, the Article recasts the history of the U.S. Supreme
Court's "dual sovereignty" doctrine entirely in terms of jurisdiction,
penetrating the opacity of the term "sovereign" as it is often deployed by
the Court and supplying a useful analyticalpredictorfor future extension
of the doctrine. The Article then applies the theory to the international
legal system to explain the confused and seemingly dissonant body of
modern internationallaw andpractice on double jeopardy, including the
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internationallaw of human rights and extradition, internationalcriminal
tribunalstatutes, and the exercise of universaljurisdiction.
The Article next explores the theory's implications for US and
international law in light of two main double jeopardy concerns: the
individual right to be free from multiple prosecutions, and the sovereign
ability to enforce law. It argues that since the U.S. dual sovereignty
doctrine originally derived and continues to derive justificationfrom the
sovereign'sjurisdictionover the defendant, the Court'spresent analysis is
incomplete and betrays the doctrine's own foundations by ignoring a
basic, and necessary, constitutional inquiry: whether a successively
prosecuting sovereign's exercise ofjurisdictionsatisfies due process. This
inquiry would enrich present doctrine by incorporatingindividual rights
concerns-concernsthat are now completely absentfrom dual sovereignty
analysis-andholds the potential to alter outcomes, especially in cases of
successive prosecutionsbetween U.S. states and by the federal government
when it exercises jurisdiction extraterritorially. The theory similarly
enriches internationaldoctrine through a reasonableness evaluation of a
successively prosecuting nation-state's jurisdiction that resembles U.S.
due process tests. Finally, the Article suggests that where multiple
sovereigns legitimately may exercise jurisdiction, it does not mean that
they will; institutionalized comity mechanisms between enforcement
authorities of different sovereigns can accommodate both the sovereign
interest to enforce law and the individual interest to be free from multiple
prosecutions by encouraging the representation of multiple sovereigns'
interests in a single prosecutionin a singleforum.
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INTRODUCTION

Why can the U.S. federal government prosecute someone for a bank
robbery when that person already has been prosecuted for the same bank
robbery by the state of Illinois,1 and vice versa? 2 Similarly, why can

Alabama prosecute for a homicide
that is already the subject of a final
3
criminal judgment in Georgia?
Now transpose these questions to the international arena where the
political stakes may be far higher and the legal implications even more
complex and controversial. If a U.S. national is alleged to have committed
a crime in Egypt for which he is prosecuted in Egyptian courts, does
international law have anything to say about whether the United States can
prosecute him again for the same crime? What if the United States
prosecutes first and it is Egypt that seeks a second prosecution? Suppose
the crime alleged is torture, or a war crime. Would a prior conviction or
acquittal in U.S. courts block a prosecution by Spain or Germany under a
universal jurisdiction law over such crimes? Could a prosecution by one of
these states block the United States from prosecuting its own national?
What if instead the case were referred to an international tribunal, like the
International Criminal Court? When would a prosecution in national court
bar an international tribunal prosecution, and when would an international
tribunal prosecution bar a prosecution in national court?
The language of double jeopardy permeates U.S. and international law.
Yet we still don't have clear answers to why or when different
"sovereigns" may prosecute for the same crime. These questions highlight
a central tension between the very idea of sovereignty and the
longstanding, widely held legal intuition that an individual should not be
subject to multiple prosecutions for the same offense. The questions also
implicate the basic power structure of legal systems like the U.S. federal
and international system which purport to be comprised of distinct
sovereigns-the several states of the United States and the world's nationstates, respectively.
How to, and how best to, answer these double jeopardy questions
present legal and policy challenges that are only going to gain in frequency
and importance in an increasingly globalized world with an increasing
potential for jurisdictional overlap among sovereigns. Conventional

1. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377
(1922).
2. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
3. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
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accounts of how double jeopardy rules work in systems of multiple

sovereigns not only fail descriptively to capture the complexity of existing
law, but also fall flat as normative depictions of the high-stakes struggle of
interests the rules necessarily imply. Now more than ever, lawyers and
policy makers need a sophisticated way of thinking about, and resolving,
the competing claims of sovereigns to enforce their laws; of defendants
not to be prosecuted multiple times for the same crime; of victims to see

justice done; and, not least, of the systems of sovereigns themselves to
avoid destabilization through prosecutorial overreaching
members to the affront and provocation of others.

by

some

In the U.S. context, the Supreme Court's facile resort to the doctrine of
dual sovereignty functions mainly as an analysis-stopper. By labeling
successively prosecuting entities separate sovereigns, the Court permits
multiple prosecutions and ends all further discussion under the
Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. 4 Yet how to determine what
constitutes a "sovereign" within the meaning of the doctrine is far from
clear. And while the doctrine has invited its fair share of criticism (indeed,
it is hard to find any commentary that is not critical),5 there has been little
focused effort to peel back the label of "sovereign" and cleanly articulate
what underlies its meaning in this jurisprudence. 6 We are left instead with
a famously opaque doctrine 7 and a dearth of analytical tools for predicting

its future extension.

4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. See Ronald J. Allen & John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine
and Rationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMrNOLOGY 801, 818 (1985); Akhil Reed
Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-28
(1995); Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule PermittingSuccessive Prosecutions
in the Age of Cooperative Federalism,20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1992); Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual
Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 383 (1986); George C.
Thomas III, Islands in the Stream of History: An InstitutionalArcheology of Dual Sovereignty, 1 OHiO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 345 (2003); see also Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereigns, and the
Intruding Constitution, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 591 (1961); Thomas Franck, An InternationalLawyer
Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1096 (1959); J. A. C. Grant, Successive Prosecutions by
State and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1956)
[hereinafter Grant, Successive Prosecutions]; J. A. C. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive
Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1309 (1932) [hereinafter Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive
Prosecutions];Lawrence Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecutions:A
Suggested Solution, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 252 (1961); George C. Pontikes, DualSovereignty andDouble
Jeopardy:A Critique ofBartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United States, 14 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 700
(1963).
6. See e.g., Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 5, at 817-19.
7. Much criticism leveled at the doctrine is that it is unprincipled, see generally id., or simply
the accident of peculiar historical moments. See, e.g., Thomas, supranote 5, at 345; Murchison, supra
note 5, at 383.
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The international legal context is even more perplexing. International
instruments and state practice seem to point in so many directions at once
that the international law of double jeopardy looks to be nothing more than
a jumbled mess of partial and often inconsistent rules implying a general
doctrinal incoherence. Human rights and humanitarian law instruments
guarantee a right against double jeopardy, but only from successive
prosecutions by a single state. 8 Extradition treaties guarantee protection
from successive prosecutions between states, but only in certain
circumstances. 9 State practice is literally all over the map, with some states
providing near absolute double jeopardy protection based on a foreign
prosecution, and others none at all. 10 At the same time, a clear and uniform
international trend appears to be taking hold that would preclude
prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction if the defendant has been (or
in many cases will be) prosecuted by a state where the crime took place or
whose nationals were directly involved. Added to the mix are the statutes
of international criminal tribunals, which protect against successive
prosecutions as between states and tribunals in some cases but not in
others.1 2 Perhaps because of this doctrinal disarray, commentary has
tended to concentrate on discrete double jeopardy issues,13 with no work
tackling head-on the larger question of whether this apparently discordant
body of law and practice might be explicable through a unifying,
explanatory theory.14
This Article sets out to develop such a theory. The Article then uses the
theory to explain, critique, and offer improvements to double jeopardy
rules among sovereigns in the U.S. and international legal systems. To be
clear from the start, I do not intend to suggest that these two systems are
identical; they aren't. Or that double jeopardy rules work exactly the same
way in U.S. and international law; they don't. But I do want to use the
heuristic and analogical value of each system for the other to come up with

8.

See infra Part IV.A.

9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part IV.C.
11.

See infra Part IV.D.

12. See infra Part IV.E.
13. See, e.g., Michele N. Morosin, Double Jeopardy and International Law: Obstacles to
Formulating a GeneralPrinciple, 64 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 261 (1995) (discussing application of the
double jeopardy principle to the Draft Statute of the ICC, Draft Code of Crimes and the ICTY Statute);
Christine Van den Wyngaert & Guy Stessens, The InternationalNon bis in Idem Principle:Resolving
Some of the UnansweredQuestions, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 779 (1999).

14. One author proposes a "core" double jeopardy rule either as a future customary rule or
general principle, but does not resolve tensions in present international law and practice. See Gerard
Conway, Ne bis in Idem in InternationalLaw, 3 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 217 (2003).
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an innovative and persuasive theory that explains double jeopardy rules in
both. I then evaluate those rules and, ultimately, show how they can be
improved by the present theory.
My basic premise will be that "sovereignty" for double jeopardy
purposes really means the legal concept of jurisdiction-and, more
specifically, independent jurisdiction to prescribe, or to make and apply,
law. This prescriptive jurisdiction in turn authorizes independent
jurisdiction to enforce that law through a separate prosecution.
Part I combines the Supreme Court's dual sovereignty language with
international concepts of jurisdiction to articulate this basic premise. Part
II then recasts the history of dual sovereignty in the U.S. federal context
using the concepts introduced in Part I. It explains that the doctrine
originated out of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction in the U.S.
federal system, and that throughout its evolution the Court has consistently
justified the doctrine's application in terms of jurisdiction-and, more
specifically, in terms of independent jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce
law. The theory therefore both opens up analysis of how and why the
Court has employed the dual sovereignty doctrine in the past and provides
a helpful predictor of how the Court will extend it in the future.
Parts III and IV apply the jurisdictional theory to the international legal
system. Using the theory, Part III derives a few baseline rules of
international double jeopardy. It argues that: (1) a state with an
independent basis of national jurisdiction deriving mainly from
entitlements over national territory and persons is an independent
lawgiver, or "sovereign," for double jeopardy purposes that retains the
ability to apply and enforce its own laws through prosecution in the face of
prior prosecutions by other states; and (2) the state may do so whether the
crime is a national offense (like homicide) or is also an international
offense (like genocide); but (3) where a state's jurisdiction derives solely
from a shared entitlement with all other states to apply and enforce the
international law against universal crimes, it should be blocked from
prosecuting again if another state already has prosecuted for the crime in
question. Part III concludes by showing that these same rules of
international double jeopardy were enunciated in a U.S. Supreme Court
opinion from 1820, the same year the Court began to develop the
jurisdictional reasoning that underpins the dual sovereignty doctrine in the
U.S. federal system today.
Part IV demonstrates that these rules continue to explain modem
international law and practice. They explain, for example, why human
rights and humanitarian law instruments limit their double jeopardy
coverage to successive prosecutions by one state, why extradition treaties
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so narrowly and self-consciously construe an exception to the default rule
permitting double jeopardy among states, why no general principle of law
has developed to prevent double jeopardy among states, and why the one
situation in which states overwhelmingly if not uniformly refrain from
pursuing successive prosecutions is where their only basis of jurisdiction
is the universal nature of the crime under international law. Part IV also
uses a jurisdictional analysis to explain double jeopardy protections in
international tribunal statutes. Taking as its primary examples the
Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals (ICTY and ICTR, respectively) and the
International Criminal Court (ICC), it describes how the double jeopardy
protections in the different tribunal statutes are integrally tied to their
jurisdictional provisions, and how these provisions largely create a shared
jurisdiction-through either primacy or complementary jurisdictionbetween tribunals and national courts, such that when one exercises
jurisdiction it extinguishes the jurisdiction of the other, leading to double
jeopardy protection between them. Where tribunal statutes do allow for
successive prosecutions, it is because the double jeopardy provision in
question has reserved a portion of jurisdiction to either the state or the
tribunal, upon which that entity successively may prosecute.
Next, the theory not only advances current double jeopardy
conversation by making sense of a confused doctrine in highly charged
areas, it also facilitates clarity in assessing that doctrine and recommends
adjustments to it. Part V accordingly shifts focus to engage some of the
theory's more important implications for U.S. and international law as
measured against an axial tension in double jeopardy rules among
sovereigns: the tension between the individual's right to be free from
multiple prosecutions and the sovereign's power to enforce law over
activity harmful to its interests. Part V argues that a jurisdictional theory
improves conventional analysis in both U.S. and international law to better
accommodate this tension. Specifically, the theory brings into an
otherwise simplistically one-dimensional sovereignty doctrine not only the
interests of other sovereigns and the larger systems they comprise, but
also, importantly, the interests of individual defendants.
First, since under the theory a prosecuting entity's "sovereignty" within
the U.S. dual sovereignty doctrine derives from the entity's jurisdiction
over the defendant, it follows that the exercise of that jurisdiction by either
federal or state government must satisfy due process under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 15 The Supreme Court's

15.

U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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obtuse dual sovereignty analysis presently ignores this basic constitutional
inquiry-a decidedly nuanced, fact-sensitive evaluation geared toward
ensuring that a sovereign's exercise of jurisdiction is not "arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair." 16 The result is an incomplete doctrine divorced
from its own intellectual and constitutional roots, and one that completely
ignores individual rights. I explain that while a due process evaluation of a
successively prosecuting sovereign's jurisdiction likely would not impact
dual sovereignty rulings regarding successive federal/state prosecutionsthe original justification for the dual sovereignty doctrine-it does hold
potential to change outcomes regarding successive prosecutions between
U.S. states or by the federal government when it exercises extraterritorial
jurisdiction. And it does so in ways that directly include fairness concerns
otherwise wholly omitted by present analysis to the exclusion of
individual rights.
Second, international law contains a reasonableness limitation on
nation-states' exercise of jurisdiction that bears strong resemblances to
U.S. due process constraints, and that incorporates many of the same
considerations. 17 Conceptualizing sovereignty as jurisdiction under this
limitation demonstrates the normative appeal of the baseline international
double jeopardy rules articulated in Part III and, in particular, of the rule
precluding successive prosecutions based solely on universal jurisdiction.
A central purpose of universal jurisdiction is to vindicate the rights of
victims and the international legal system as a whole through the
enforcement of international law where states with close ties to the crimes
are either unwilling or unable to prosecute. Human rights interests thus
weigh on both sides of the double jeopardy question: on one side is the
right of the defendant not to be prosecuted again and again for the same
crime, but on the other are the rights of victims to see justice done. The
double jeopardy rules I develop for the international system balance
effectively the interests of sovereigns, defendants, victims, and the system
as a whole.
Lastly, I explore how best to reduce successive prosecutions by those
states that may successively prosecute so as to protect individuals from
multiple prosecutions while still allowing states to act against those who
cause direct harm to national interests. I suggest that one way to
accomplish this goal is through comity mechanisms that promote
communication and coordination among different sovereigns' enforcement

16. See infra notes 367-73 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 407-13 and accompanying text.
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authorities from the outset of investigatory or prosecutorial efforts. These
mechanisms enable states with direct interests in prosecution to represent
those interests from the start of a given enforcement action, increasing the
likelihood that a single enforcement action in a single forum will vindicate
interests of all states with legitimate claims to prosecute. The comity
mechanisms tend also to create efficiencies and ease friction for the
system at large by encouraging states to internalize ex ante the effects of
their own enforcement actions on other jurisdictionally interested states.
The result is a reduced need for, and probability of, multiple prosecutions
for the same crime.
I. DECONSTRUCTING "SOVEREIGNTY"

A. Double Jeopardyand the Problem of Sovereignty
The idea that an individual cannot be prosecuted multiple times for the
same offense has a long and storied pedigree18 reaching back to ancient
20
19
Greece and Rome. It was adopted early on in Church canon law,
perpetuated through the Dark Ages, 21 and gained the status of "universal
maxim of the common law" in England.22 At early common law, the plea
at bar took two forms, auterfois acquit de mOmefelonie-already acquitted
of the same offense, 23 and auterfois convict de mOme felonie-already
convicted of the same offense. 24 The term double jeopardy itself comes
from the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment guarantee: "nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb.''25 Civil law systems 26 and international legal instruments 27 often
refer to the principle by its Latin name, non bis in idem or ne bis in idem-

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 151-52 & n.3 (citing sources).
Id. at 152 & n.4 (citing sources).
Id.
Id.at 153 & n.6; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *335.

23.

Id. at *335-36; 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 240-55

(Professional Books Ltd. 1987) (1736).
24. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 7, 1987, 75
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 1 (F.R.G.),available at http://www.utexas.
edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work new/german/case.php?id=570; see discussion infra
notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., A.P. v. Italy, Communication No. 204/1986, Report of the Human Rights Comm.,
43d Sess., supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988) (interpreting the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights); see also discussion infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
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"not twice for the same thing,, 28 deriving from the Roman maxim nemo
bis vexari pro una et eadam causa, "a man shall not be twice vexed or
tried for the same cause., 29 "Nobody disputes the justice or the obligation
of the rule of former jeopardy in the abstract," 30 Charles Batchelder
famously3 1observed, "the difficulty is in deciding where it shall be
applied.,
A fundamental question for any double jeopardy protection is whether
different sovereigns successively may prosecute for the same criminal
activity. The U.S. Supreme Court has resolved the issue in the context of
U.S. federalism by developing the dual sovereignty doctrine. The doctrine
"is founded on the ... conception of crime as an offense against the
sovereignty of the government., 32 It holds that "[w]hen a defendant in a
single act violates the (peace and dignity) of two sovereigns by breaking
the laws of each, he has committed two distinct 'offences. 33 No violation
of the prohibition on double jeopardy results from successive prosecutions
by different sovereigns, according to the Court, because "by one act [the
defendant] has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly
punishable. 3 4 The defendant, in other words, is not being prosecuted
twice for the same "offence, 35 if another sovereign successively
prosecutes for the same act-even if the second sovereign prosecutes
using a law identical to that used in the first prosecution.3 6
By permitting multiple sovereigns to pursue multiple prosecutions for
the same criminal activity, the dual sovereignty doctrine immediately
raises the follow-up question: how do we tell whether a successive
prosecution is truly by another sovereign? Simply invoking the label
"sovereign" is not very helpful; standing alone the word reduces to a
tautology. It cannot tell us on its own whether a given entity-be it a
nation-state, a sub-national state, a territory, or a municipality-is truly a
sovereign.37 Rather, "sovereign" signifies the result or description
of some
38
allocation of power, not the reason for that allocation of power.

28.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (8th ed. 2004).

29. Conway, supra note 14, at 217 & n.1.
30. Charles E. Batchelder, Former Jeopardy, 17 AM. L. REv. 735, 749 (1883).
31. Id.
32. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985).
33. Id. (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).
34. Id. (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852)).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. See Heath, 474 U.S. at 87-88.
37. Louis Henkin, That "S"Word. Sovereignty, and Globalization,and Human Rights, et cetera,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999).
38. Allen & Ratnaswamy, supranote 5, at 818.
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The Supreme Court has tried to pour some content into the word for
purposes of the dual sovereignty doctrine. The key to ascertaining dual
sovereigns, according to the Court, "turns on whether the two
[prosecuting] entities draw their authority to punish the offender from
distinct sources of power., 39 Thus "the sovereignty of two prosecuting
entities for [double jeopardy] purposes is determined by the ultimate
source of the power under which the respective prosecutions were
undertaken., 40 If there are two "ultimate sources of power," there are two
sovereigns, and consequently there can be two prosecutions without
violating the prohibition on double jeopardy.4 1
But what does "ultimate source of power" mean? The Court doesn't
quite explain. It does however tell us what the features of such power are:
"Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its
peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the
other., 42 Or to rephrase it with a bit more detail, "each has the power,
inherent in any sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an
offense against its authority and to punish such offenses, and in doing so
each is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other., 43 Thus an
entity is "sovereign" when it has the power-independently--(1) to
determine what shall be an offense, and (2) to punish such offenses. 44 And
when it exercises these powers, it exercises its own sovereignty, not that of
other sovereigns.4 5 Multiple prosecutions attend multiple sovereigns
because "[f]oremost among the prerogatives
of sovereignty is the power to
46
create and enforce a criminal code."

In what follows I argue that the power to determine and enforce law is
really the legal concept of jurisdiction, and that "ultimate source of power"
is really an autonomous lawgiver with independent jurisdiction to
prescribe and enforce law-the hallmarks of "sovereignty" within the
meaning of the dual sovereignty doctrine.

39. Heath, 474 U.S. at 88.
40. Id. at 90 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978)) (internal quotations
omitted).
41. Id.
42. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
43. Heath, 474 U.S. at 89-90 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320) (internal quotations omitted).
44. Id. at 89.
45. Id. at 89-90.
46. Id. at 93.
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B. Sovereignty Means Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction both functionally and conceptually informs the notion of
sovereignty. Functionally, it is a legal term for power. 47 If a court or
legislature has no jurisdiction over you, it has no power over you. Here is
where international law helps out the analysis. International law regularly
divides jurisdiction into three types: jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction
to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce.48 Jurisdiction to prescribe, or
prescriptive jurisdiction, is the power to make and apply law to persons or
things. 49 Generally speaking, this power is typically, though not always,
exercised by a legislative body,50 such as the Congress in the United States
(or a state legislature in one of the several U.S. states). Jurisdiction to
adjudicate, or adjudicative jurisdiction, is the power to subject an
individual to adjudicative process. 51 This power is typically, though again
not always, exercised by the judiciary.5 2 And jurisdiction to enforce, or
enforcement jurisdiction, is self-evidently the power to enforce law, which
is often carried out through prosecution backed up by police force.53
Importantly, adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction must rely upon
some prescriptive jurisdiction.54 Thus if a prosecuting entity has no
prescriptive jurisdiction over a particular activity, it has no power to
subject the parties to that activity to judicial process and enforcement.55
Framed in the Supreme Court's dual sovereignty language, prescriptive
jurisdiction represents (1) the power "to determine what shall be an
offense, 56 and adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction represent (2) the
power "to punish such offenses. ' 57 Where an entity has an independent
prescriptive jurisdiction, it is functionally a "sovereign" as envisaged by
the dual sovereignty doctrine: it independently may determine what shall
be an offense, and may marshal its adjudicative and enforcement
jurisdiction to punish that offense.

47. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 28, at 867.
48.
(1987).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401

49. Id. § 401(a).
50. Id. § 401 & intro, note.
51.

Id. § 401(b).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. § 401 & intro, note.
Id. § 401(c) & intro, note.
Id. § 431 cmt. a.
Id.
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1985).
Id.
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C. Ultimate Source ofPower Means Lawgiver
Conceiving of sovereignty as independent jurisdiction to prescribe law
is moreover conceptually and etymologically faithful to the term
jurisdiction, which derives from the Latin jus or juris (law) plus dicere
(speak). 58 At its root, jurisdiction means "the speaking of law.",59 For any
given community the law-speaker is manifest in the body-and, even
more specifically, in the mouth-of the sovereign. This was quite literally
the case in absolute monarchies, where the King or Queen pronounced the
law. 60 It is abstractly captured in theocracies, where God speaks through
earthly interpreters of religious texts. And it can be generalized to
democratic rule, where "popular sovereignty" prevails and government
mobilizes when "the people have spoken." As the literal or figurative
mouthpiece of the law, the sovereign is what we might think of as the
lawgiver for those within its jurisdiction-those for whom it "speaks law."
The sovereign's unique lawgiving voice is what gives rise to its power
independently to determine offenses and to punish them; in other words,
what makes it sovereign within the meaning of the dual sovereignty
doctrine.
To cast this all in the Supreme Court's terminology then, "ultimate
source of power" 61 represents the law-speaker or lawgiver; the lawgiver
has the power "independently to determine what shall be an offense" 62 _or
to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction, which authorizes its power "to punish
such offenses" 63 -or to exercise adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction.
II. As APPLIED

TO THE

U.S.

FEDERAL SYSTEM

This Part traces the origins and development of the dual sovereignty
doctrine in the U.S. system and explains the doctrine's entire history in
terms of jurisdiction. My purpose is threefold: to look through the term
"sovereign" to understand what is really motivating the Court's analysis;
to lay some analogical groundwork for the international system discussed

58. SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 1472 (William R. Trumbull &
Angus J. Stevenson eds., 5th ed. 2002).
59. Costas Douzinas, The Metaphysics of Jurisdiction, in JURISPRUDENCE OF JURISDICTION 21,
22 (Shaun McVeigh ed., 2007).
60. JEAN-LUc NANCY, THE BIRTH TO PRESENCE 132 (Brian Holmes et al. trans., Stanford Univ.
Press 1993).
61. Heath, 474 U.S. at90.
62. Id. at 89-90.
63. Id.
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in the next two Parts; and to set the stage for a critique of present U.S. dual
sovereignty doctrine in Part V.
The dual sovereignty doctrine took shape in early Supreme Court
jurisprudence addressed to the question of concurrent jurisdiction between
federal and state governments. Justice Johnson began setting the doctrine's
foundation in his 1820 concurrence in Houston v. Moore.64 Houston
upheld Pennsylvania's ability to try a militiaman for failing to report for
federal service.65 Justice Washington issued the judgment of the Court,
concluding that the state court martial could enforce federal law.66 For
Justice Washington, the question presented was whether the state court
could exercise concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction with federal courts to
enforce federal law, which he answered affirmatively. 67 As David Currie
has noted, "Washington, however, cannot be said to have spoken for the
Court in Houston,"68 because of the disagreement on the reasoning for the
judgment. 69 Justice Johnson was clear on this, explaining at the end of his
concurrence that "there is no point whatever decided, except that the fine
was constitutionally imposed" by the state court,70 and that "[t]he course
of reasoning by which the judges have reached this conclusion are [sic]
various, coinciding in but one thing, viz., that there is no error in the
judgment [below] .,71
For Johnson, the case had more to do with concurrent prescriptive
jurisdiction. According to Johnson, Houston's complaint was "that his
offence was an offence against the laws of the United States, [and] that he
is liable to be punished under [federal] laws, and cannot, therefore, be
constitutionally punished under the laws of his own State., 72 Johnson
rejected this argument, and asked rhetorically: "Why may not the same
offence be made punishable both under the laws of the States, and of the
United States? '73 He answered himself that "[e]very citizen of a State
owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protection and participates in the

64. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 25-32.
67. Id.
68. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the FederalCourts,
1801 1835, 49 U. Cmu. L. REv. 646, 702 (1982).
69. Id. at 705 (explaining that Washington "noted that while all but two Justices agreed that the
judgment should stand, 'they do not concur in all respects in the reasons which influence my opinion.'
What is peculiar is that except for Johnson, who wrote a long concurrence, we do not know the
grounds on which the other Justices voted." (citing Houston, 18 U.S. at 32-47)).
70. Houston, 18 U.S. at 47 (Johnson, J., concurring).
71.

Id.

72. Id. at 32-33.
73.

Id. at 33.
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government of both the State and the United States., 74 Johnson observed
75
that the "exercise of this concurrent right of punishing is familiar,,
giving the example of robbing the mail on the highway, "which is
unquestionably cognizable as highway-robbery under the State laws," but
also a federal offense under U.S. law.76
Johnson then addressed a main counterargument to such concurrent
federal and state jurisdiction; namely "if the States can at all legislate or
adjudicate on the subject" of federal regulation, "they may... embarrass[]
the progress of the general government., 77 That is, if state jurisdiction
overlaps with federal jurisdiction, the states could thwart the federal
government's ability to carry out federal lawmaking and enforcement
functions. One obvious way for the states to do this, of course, would be to
acquit an individual in state court so as to insulate him from prosecution in
federal court for the same act. Or, as Johnson put it, "[i]t is true, if we
could admit that an acquittal in the State Courts could be pleaded in bar to
78
a prosecution in the Courts of the United States, the evil might occur.,
Yet such a reading of double jeopardy doctrine, in Johnson's view, would
be wrong:
But this is a doctrine [prior acquittal as a bar to double jeopardy]
which can only be maintained on the ground that an offence against
the laws of the one government, is an offence against the other
government; and can surely never be successfully asserted in any
instances but those in which jurisdiction is vested in the State
Courts by statutory provisions of the United States.... [C]rimes
against a government are only cognizable in its own Courts, or in
those which derive their right of holding jurisdiction from the
offended government.79
Because the state government and the federal government-as distinct
lawgivers-enjoy distinct jurisdictions to make and apply distinct laws,
distinct prosecutions would be permissible.
Indeed, the only circumstance in which double jeopardy protection
against a successive federal prosecution could arise, according to Johnson,
would be where state courts acted on behalf of the federal government in

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.at 34.
Id.
Id.at 35.
Id.
Id.
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applyingfederallaw, i.e., where "jurisdiction is vested in the State Courts
by statutory provisions of the United States."80 In this limited
circumstance, state courts would act as the adjudicative and enforcement
agents not of state law, but of federal law. They would "derive their right
of holding jurisdiction" 81 not from the state's lawgiving authority to
prescribe offenses, but from the federal government's, and would therefore
be constrained to apply not state, but federal law. 82 A successive federal
court prosecution in these circumstances would lead to double jeopardy
problems since the doctrine 83prohibits successive prosecutions under the
same law-here, federal law.
A few mid-nineteenth century cases entrenched Johnson's concurrent
jurisdiction reasoning in Houston and foreshadowed its evolution into the
dual sovereignty doctrine. In Fox v. Ohio,84 the defendant challenged her
state conviction for passing counterfeit coin on the grounds that only the
federal government had jurisdiction over that offense. The Court disposed
of the challenge by distinguishing counterfeiting, which was an offense
exclusively within the power of Congress to proscribe, from
passing
85
counterfeit coin, which was a fraud punishable under state law.
The Court then discussed the possibility, raised by the defendant8 6 and
by Justice McLean in dissent, 87 that because of concurrent federal and
state jurisdictions a defendant could be prosecuted and punished twice "for
acts essentially the same. 88 The Court conceded the possibility, but
hedged that "the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the State
and federal systems are administered" would make such double jeopardy
exceptional as a policy matter.8 9 The Court was careful to point out,
however, that if the policy were the other way around-if instead of being
the exception, double jeopardy by state and federal prosecutions were the
regular practice-such practice would be entirely permissible.
Immediately after speculating that successive prosecutions likely would

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 130 (1958).
83. Washington's opinion, which viewed the state court in Houston as enforcing federal law, see
supra note 67, contemplated this type of double jeopardy bar. See Houston, 18 U.S. at 31 (explaining
that "if the jurisdiction of the two Courts be concurrent, the sentence of either Court, either of
conviction or acquittal, might be pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the other").
84. 46 U.S. 410, 433 (1847).
85. Id.at 433-34.
86. Id. at 428.
87. Id. at 439-40 (McLean, J., dissenting).
88. Id.at 435.
89. Id.
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only "occur in instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety
demanded extraordinary rigor, ' 9° the Court explained:
But were a contrary course of policy and action either probable or
usual, this would by no means justify the conclusion, that offences
falling within the competency of different authorities to restrain or
punish them would not properly be subjected to the consequences
which those authorities might ordain and affix to their
perpetration. 91
Thus even if successive prosecutions by state and federal governments
were the norm, it still would not undermine the power of each government
to prohibit, prosecute, and punish "offences falling within the
competency," or jurisdiction, "of [these] different authorities, ' '92 or
lawgivers. And because passing counterfeit coin was "clearly within the
rightful power and jurisdiction of the State [of Ohio]," the case raised no
94
constitutional problem.9 3 Three years later in United States v. Marigold,
the Court affirmed Fox's concurrent jurisdiction holding, explaining that
the states and Congress each had independent jurisdiction to prosecute and
punish uttering false currency. 95
Just two years later, Moore v. Illinois96 solidified the jurisdictional
foundation laid by Houston, Fox, and Marigold. Moore involved a
challenge to a state court conviction under an Illinois law outlawing
harboring fugitive slaves.97 Advancing what by now should be a familiar
pair of arguments, Moore contended that the federal Fugitive Slave Act
preempted the Illinois statute such that he could not be prosecuted under
state law and raised the related objection that if the Court ruled the Illinois
statute valid then he impermissibly could be subject to multiple
prosecutions for the same offense. 98 In response to the first contention, the
Court found no federal preemption but rather that Illinois had an
independent jurisdiction to prohibit the activity in question; that is, the
statute was "but the exercise of the power which every State is admitted to
99
possess, of defining offences and punishing offenders against its laws."

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
50 U.S. 560 (1850).
Id.
at 569-70.
55 U.S. 13 (1852).
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
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And in response to the double jeopardy concern, the Court announced the
dual sovereignty doctrine:

An offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a
law.... Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State

or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns,
and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of
either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws
of both.... That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an
offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the
offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that
by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is
justly punishable. He could100
not plead the punishment by one in bar
to a conviction by the other.
The Supreme Court repeated Moore's concurrent jurisdiction reasoning
in a number of opinions0 1 before finally confronting a true case of
multiple prosecutions in its 1922 decision United States v. Lanza.10 2 Given

100. Id. at 19-20.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). The only relevant opinion during this
period that arguably did not affirm the dual sovereignty doctrine was Nielson v. Oregon,212 U.S. 315
(1909). There, a Washington resident appealed his Oregon conviction for purse net fishing on the
Columbia River, the common boundary between Oregon and Washington. Id. The activity was
explicitly permitted under Washington law but prohibited under Oregon law. Id. at 321. By legislation
Congress had granted both states a shared jurisdiction over the river in order "to avoid any nice
question as to whether a criminal act sought to be prosecuted was committed on one side or the other
of the exact boundary in the channel." Id. at 320. The Court ruled that Oregon could not punish that
which Washington permitted within its own territory (including the river). Id. at 321. In reaching its
decision the Court noted in dicta that
where an act is ... prohibited and punishable by the laws of both States, the one first
acquiring jurisdiction of the person may prosecute the offense, and its judgment is a finality
in both States, so that one convicted or acquitted in the courts of the one State cannot be
prosecuted for the same offense in the courts of the other.
Id. at 320. Some commentators have seized upon this passage as supporting a double jeopardy bar
among different sovereigns. See, e.g., Grant, Successive Prosecutions, supra note 5, at 1-2;
Murchison, supranote 5, at 386.
Yet under a theory that equates sovereignty with independent prescriptive jurisdiction, it is
possible to make sense of the Nielson dicta, especially in light of the Court's holding. The key is to
remember that the shared jurisdiction of Washington and Oregon over the river was a product of
congressional legislation authorizing that shared jurisdiction. Neilson, 212 U.S. at 320. If sovereignty
is independent jurisdiction to prescribe law, and Oregon and Washington share jurisdiction such that
neither can prohibit something that the other permits, id. at 319, then neither state really can be said to
have independent prescriptive jurisdiction over the river, i.e., sovereignty. The reason a conviction or
acquittal in the courts of one state for an offense punishable by the laws of both would bar successive
prosecution by the other is that there is only one prescriptive jurisdiction-granted by Congress-that
both states share over the river, albeit one that each may enforce in its own courts. But this single,
shared jurisdiction to prescribe a particular offense cannot be enforced multiple times.
102. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 377. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550-51 (1875)
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this history, the reasoning inspiring Lanza should come as no surprise.
Upholding a successive federal prosecution under the prohibition-era
Volstead Act after a state court conviction for the same acts, the Court
explained: "Each State, as also Congress, may exercise an independent
judgment in selecting and shaping measures to enforce prohibition. Such
as are adopted by Congress become laws of the United States and such as
are adopted by a State become laws of that State." 10 3 The independent
judgment to determine and enforce law, the Court elaborated, "is an
inseparable incident of independent legislative action in distinct
jurisdictions." 10 4 Thus in the first true application of the dual sovereignty
doctrine, the Court explicitly employed the concept of jurisdiction-and,
more specifically, independent prescriptive jurisdiction to determine
offenses-to justify its holding.
The Court would go on to use the dual sovereignty doctrine to uphold
successive federal court prosecutions following state court convictions for
the same acts; 105 successive state court prosecutions (and convictions)
following acquittal of the same acts in federal court; 10 6 successive federal
court prosecutions following conviction for the same acts in Indian Tribal
Courts; 10 7 and successive prosecutions in different state courts for the
same act where the defendant pleaded guilty in the first case to avoid the
death penalty but was sentenced to death in the second. 10 8
On the other hand, where the Court has been unwilling to find a dual
sovereignty exception to double jeopardy, it has stressed the absence of an
independent prescriptive jurisdiction by each prosecuting entity and has
emphasized that both entities draw their jurisdiction from the same
lawgiving source. In Grafton v. United States, for example, the Court held
that a homicide prosecution by military court martial foreclosed a
successive prosecution for the same homicide by the civil justice system in
the then-U.S. territory of the Philippines. 10 9 The Articles of War, through

(observing that because the states and the federal government "have separate jurisdictions ... it may
sometimes happen that a person is amenable to both jurisdictions for one and the same act,"
consequently "[h]e owes allegiance to two sovereignties, and claims protection from both"; "[hie owes
allegiance to the two departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the
penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return, he can demand protection from
each within its own jurisdiction.").
103. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 381.
104. Id.
105. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
106. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
107. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2003).
108. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
109. 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
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which Congress had established court martial jurisdiction, conferred upon
courts martial a general peacetime "jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier
of the Army for any offense, not capital, which the civil law declares to be
a crime against the public." 110 The Court explained that this authorization
was limited to those crimes "in violation of public law enforced by the
civil power" in the territory where the court martial sat.111 Based on this
general authorization, the court martial prosecuted Grafton for "the crime
of homicide as defined by the Penal Code of the Philippines."'1 12 Because
the court martial applied the civil law definition of homicide, the Court
found that the successive 1civil
court prosecution at issue in the case was
13
"for the identical offense."
The Supreme Court then turned to the argument that, notwithstanding
the court martial use of the Filipino criminal code definition of homicide,
the military and civil authorities in a U.S. territory constituted distinct
sovereigns-each with an independent power to prescribe offenses and to
prosecute-and consequently no double jeopardy barrier arose to block a
successive civil court prosecution for the same acts. 114 The Court rejected
this argument and resolved the issue entirely in terms of jurisdiction.115
Because Congress had exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the
territories, and created the territorial courts and authorized their
adjudicative jurisdiction, the courts were capable of applying only U.S.
law. 116 The Court found "[t]he jurisdiction and authority of the United
States over that territory and its inhabitants, for all legitimate purposes of
government, is paramount." 117 It followed that "[i]f... a person be tried
for an offense in a tribunal deriving its jurisdiction and authority from the
United States and is acquitted or convicted, he cannot again be tried for the
same offense in another tribunal deriving its jurisdiction and authority
from the United States." '1 8 Since both the military court martial and the
territorial civil court derived jurisdiction from the U.S. government, and
thus necessarily prosecuted for a crime against the laws of the United

110. Id.at 351.
111. Id. at 348. Indeed, "[t]he act done is a civil crime, and the trial is for that act." Id. at 347. The
only reason the trial would take place in military court, and not civil court, is that the military court
had personal jurisdiction over the accused (although the civil courts also could prosecute if they were
to first gain custody). Id.
112. Id. at 349.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 351.
115. Id.at 352.
116. Id.at 354-55.
117. Id.

118. Id. at 352.
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States, "a second trial of the accused for that crime in the same or another
court, civil
or military, of the same government" violated double
1 19

jeopardy.

The origins and development of the dual sovereignty doctrine thus
clearly show that the term "sovereign" as it has been used by the Supreme
Court is best understood as the legal concept of jurisdiction and, more
specifically, independent jurisdiction to prescribe law. Parts III and IV
show how this understanding fits international law and practice, and Part
V uses it to expose constitutional deficiencies in the Supreme Court's
present dual sovereignty analysis.
III. As

APPLIED TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

This Part adapts to the international legal system the argument that
sovereignty in the double jeopardy context really means independent
jurisdiction to prescribe law. I discern two kinds of prescriptive
jurisdiction in international law. One kind I label "national jurisdiction";
the other I label "international jurisdiction." National jurisdiction derives
from what we typically think of as sovereignty in international law and
relations. It springs from independent entitlements of each individual state
vis-d-vis other states in the international system to make and apply its own
law-principally, from entitlements over national territory and persons.
We might think of national courts exercising national jurisdiction and
applying national law in the international system as roughly analogous to
U.S. state courts applying their own state's law in the U.S. federal system.
What I will refer to as international jurisdiction, on the other hand,
derives from a state's shared entitlement-along with all other states as
members of the international system-to enforce international law. At the
risk of stretching an analogy beyond its natural breaking point, we might
think of national courts exercising international jurisdiction, and thus
applying and enforcing international law, as roughly analogous to U.S.

119. Id. On this logic, the Court later found that a municipality is not a distinct sovereign from a
state because, like Congress's power over the territories, the state legislature had the power "to
establish, and to abolish, municipalities[,] to provide for their government, to prescribe their
jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time." Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387,
393 (1970) (internal quotations omitted). This comports with "the traditional view ... that ... the
constitutional status of local governments [rests] entirely on the theory that a local government is
merely an administrative arm of the state, utterly lacking in autonomy or in constitutional rights
against the state that created it." Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 85 (1990); see also id. at 7-8.
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federal courts geographically sitting in different U.S. states but applying
and enforcing the same federal law.
In short, two different kinds of entitlements authorize two different
kinds of jurisdiction, and ultimately come to represent two different kinds
of lawgivers or "sovereigns" for double jeopardy purposes: one national
and the other international. This analysis produces three basic double
jeopardy rules for the international legal system that will be illustrated
below.
A. NationalJurisdiction
If sovereignty really means jurisdiction within the meaning of the dual
sovereignty doctrine, translating the doctrine to the international realm
creates an instant linguistic circularity. The reason is that the term
sovereignty is often invoked to imply that which authorizes a nationstate's jurisdiction in the first place, to wit: State A has jurisdiction over
State A territory because State A is "sovereign" over its territory. Hence
the regularly invoked combination: "sovereign jurisdiction." And hence
the circularity: sovereign = jurisdiction = sovereign again within the
meaning of the dual sovereignty doctrine.
Our first step is to unpack this circularity. We can begin by breaking
out what we mean by the first "sovereign" in the equation; that is, by
considering what authorizes an individual state's jurisdiction under
international law. Here the first "sovereign" is shorthand, again containing
no real independent analytic force, 120 for an established list of state
entitlements 121 recognized by international law that, taken together,
essentially define the state as a "state." 122 For example, principal among
123
these entitlements is power over a certain piece of geographic territory.
To avoid too much confusion, instead of calling these entitlements
"sovereign" entitlements we can call them "national" entitlements. Thus
State A has jurisdiction over State A territory because of State A's national
entitlement, as recognized by international law, over its territory. And

120.

See supraPart I.A.

121.

I borrow the "entitlement" terminology here from Anthony D'Amato. See Anthony

D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1113 (1982)

[hereinafter D'Amato, Human Rights]; Anthony D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really "Law"?, 79
Nw. U. L. REv. 1293, 1308 (1984) [hereinafter D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really "Law"?]. For a
recent interesting and persuasive discussion of the universal jurisdictional entitlement to prosecute, see
Eugene Kontorovich, The Inefficiency of UniversalJurisdiction,2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 389 (observing

the inefficiencies and obstacles universal jurisdiction poses to international peace-making).
122.

D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really "Law "?, supranote 121, at 1308.

123. Id.
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instead of calling this State A's "sovereign jurisdiction" we can call it
State A's "national jurisdiction." Accordingly, national entitlement =
national jurisdiction = sovereign within the meaning of the dual
sovereignty doctrine.
The list of entitlements recognized by international law authorizing a
state's national jurisdiction is fairly intuitive. As already mentioned, a
state legitimately may claim jurisdiction over activity that occurs, even in
substantial part, within its territory. 124 This is called subjective
territoriality.125 A state also may claim jurisdiction over activity that does
not occur but that has an effect within its territory, or what is called
objective territoriality. 126 Furthermore, a state may claim jurisdiction over
activity that involves its nationals. 127 Where the acts in question are
committed by a state's nationals, the state may claim active personality
jurisdiction. 128 And where the acts victimize a state's nationals, the state
may claim passive personality jurisdiction. 129 Additionally, under the
protective principle a state may claim jurisdiction over activity that is
directed against the state's security and/or its ability to carry out
official
13
state functions, such as its exclusive right to print state currency. 0
Each of these entitlements relates distinctly back to the particular state
claiming jurisdiction-whether to its territory, to punishing or protecting
its nationals, or to affirming its very statehood. 131 And because
international law recognizes multiple national entitlements, there may well
be multiple states with national jurisdiction over a given activity. Thus
Germany may claim jurisdiction over acts committed by a German
13 3
132
national in the United States, but clearly so too may the United States.134
In such cases there are overlapping or concurrent national jurisdictions.

124.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF

THE UNITED

STATES

§ 402(1)(a) (1987).
125. See id.; see also Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 435, 484-87 (1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research Draft].
126.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 402(1)(c); see also Harvard Research Draft, supranote 125, at 487-94.
127.
128.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2).
See id.; see also BARTON LEGUM, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE

211 (American Bar Association 2005); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: U.S.
LAW AND PRACTICE 346-49 (3d ed. 1996).
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2)
cmt. g.
130. Id. § 402(3) cmt. f.
131. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdictionand National Courts,
in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

§ 402(2).
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Yet the list of national entitlements also circumscribes the jurisdiction
of states. While the entitlements authorize the projection of one state's
laws to activity taking place in other states, for example where activity
abroad affects the first state's territory or involves its nationals, such
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction still requires some measurable and
objective nexus to the first state's national entitlements. 135 For instance,
absent some nexus, Germany may not apply its racial hate speech laws to
speech by U.S. nationals, speaking only in the United States and having no
connection to Germany.
Finally, within the parameters of its national jurisdiction a state enjoys
a relatively free hand under international law to exercise its lawgiving
power however it chooses. With the notable exception that it may not
prescribe laws contrary to fundamental norms of international law 136 -for
example, a state may not, under international law, legislatively endorse or
permit genocide 137-international
law leaves states at great liberty to
regulate whatever conduct they deem deserving of regulation in essentially
whatever regulatory terms they like. Thus the United States claims
jurisdiction over acts that occur in the United States or involve U.S.
nationals, and Germany claims jurisdiction over acts that occur in
Germany or involve German nationals. And both the United States and
Germany may pass whatever laws they like, in pretty much whatever
terms they like, criminalizing pretty much whatever activity they like,
where that activity takes place within their geographic borders or involves
their nationals.
To sum up then, international law contains multiple bases of national
jurisdiction. These bases of jurisdiction, or sources of lawgiving power,
derive from a state's independent national entitlements as recognized by
international law; namely, the state's entitlement over its territory, its
entitlement to punish and protect its nationals, and its entitlement to secure
itself as a state. Moreover, when states seek to regulate activity falling
within the compass of their national jurisdiction, they largely are free to

133. See id. § 402(1)(a).
134. See, e.g., Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 30-1 (Sept.
7).
135. See Anthony J. Colangelo, ConstitutionalLimits on ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:Terrorism
and the Intersection of Nationaland InternationalLaw, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121, 169-75 (2007).
136. Cf Marcel Brus, Bridging the Gap between State Sovereignty and InternationalGovernance:
The Authority of Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 24 (Gerard

Kreijen ed., Oxford 2004).
137. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
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employ their domestic lawgiving apparatus however they see fit by
defining offenses according to their own individual-and independentlawgiving prerogatives. It follows that when a state prescribes an offense
against its laws and exercises its adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction
by prosecuting the perpetrator of that offense, the state is exercising its
own national entitlements. Or, we might say-to borrow the Supreme
Court's phrase-it "is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of... other
[sovereigns] .,138

B. InternationalJurisdiction
While each base of national jurisdiction just described relies upon some
nexus to a national entitlement of the state claiming jurisdiction, which
authorizes and circumscribes the reach of that state's national lawgiving
authority in relation to other states, there is another base of jurisdiction in
international law that requires no nexus at all. That base is universal
jurisdiction. 39 According to this doctrine, the very commission of certain
crimes denominated universal under international law engenders
jurisdiction for all states irrespective of where the crimes occur or which
state's nationals are involved. 140 The category of universal crime began
long ago with piracy, 141 expanded in the wake of World War II, and is now
generally considered to include serious international human rights and
humanitarian law violations like genocide, crimes against humanity,
war
142
crimes, torture, and, most recently, certain crimes of terrorism.
Instead of deriving from a state's independent national entitlements,
universal jurisdiction derives from the commission of the crime itself
under international law. It is the international nature of the crime-its very
substance and definition under international law-that gives rise to
jurisdiction for all states. Thus while a state may not, without a nexus to its
national entitlements, extend its national prescriptive reach into the
territories of other states, international law extends everywhere and

138. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987).
140. See id.; Leila Nadya Sadat, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects:
Redefining UniversalJurisdiction,35 NEWENG. L. REV. 241,246 (2001).

141. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987)); see
also THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION Principle 2(1) (Stephen Macedo ed.,
2001), available at http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers-institutes/ihrli/downloads/Princeton / 20
Principles.pdf.
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143
without limitation the international prohibition on universal crimes.
Universal jurisdiction consequently has nothing to do with any particular
state's independent nationaljurisdiction; rather it is a base of international
jurisdiction: it authorizes states not to enforce any distinctly national
entitlement but to enforce a shared international entitlement
to suppress
144
universal crimes as prescribed by international law.

For instance, justifying Israel's jurisdiction in the famous Eichmann
case over war crimes and crimes against humanity committed before the
state of Israel even existed, the Israeli Supreme Court explained:
"[I]nternational law [enforces itself] by authorizing the countries of the
world to mete out punishment for the violation of its provisions, which is
effected by putting these provisions into operation either directly or 1by
45
virtue of municipal legislation which has adopted and integrated them."
More recently, Spain's Constitutional Court made the point emphatically
when it upheld universal jurisdiction over crimes committed in Guatemala
by Guatemalans against Guatemalans, and having no link to Spain: "The
international ... prosecution which the principle of universal justice seeks
to impose is based exclusively on the specific characteristics of the crimes
which are subject to it, where the damage (as in the case of genocide)
transcends the specific victims and affects the International Community as
a whole. 14 6 The Court emphasized that "the prosecution and punishment
of [universal crimes] constitute not just a shared commitment but also a
shared interest of all States, and the legitimacy of this [jurisdiction], as a
consequence, does not depend on particular interests of each of the States

143. This argument is spelled out in more detail in Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of
UniversalJurisdiction,47 VA. J. INT'L L. 149 (2007).

144. Professor Sadat distinguishes between "universal international jurisdiction," exercised by the
international community through international tribunals, and "universal inter-state jurisdiction,"
exercised by individual states through national courts. Sadat, supranote 140, at 246-47; Leila Nadya
Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New InternationalCriminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO.
L.J. 381, 412 (2000); Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and InternationalLaw, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 955, 974-75 (2006). This helpfully explains the difference between international adjudicative

jurisdiction, created by international tribunal statutes, and national adjudicative jurisdiction, created by
national law. My argument here is that as a matter of prescriptive jurisdiction individual states
exercising universal jurisdiction are acting as decentralized enforcers of international law. By their

very nature, universal prescriptions-whether adjudicated by international tribunals or national
courts-derive from the same source of lawgiving authority: international law. The adjudicative bodies
that apply this law may be creatures of either international treaty or national legislation, but they are
enforcing the same-international-law.
145. Israel v. Eichmann [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 2033, reprinted in 2 LEON FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF
WAR 1664 (Fred L. Israel & William Hansen eds., 1972).
146. Guatemala Genocide, STC, Sept. 26, 2005 (No. 237), available at http://www.tribunal

constitucional.es/jurisprudencia/Stc2005/STC2005-237.html (English translation on file with author).
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... [and] is not configured
around links of connection founded on
147
particular state interests.,
The upshot is that while states collectively through their common and
coordinated practice contribute to international lawmaking, including the
law of universal jurisdiction, a single state cannot unilaterally and
subjectively determine what crimes are within its universal jurisdictionthat is a matter of international, not national, law. 148 For example,
Germany cannot just decide on its own that racial hate speech is now a
universal crime over which it might assert jurisdiction around the world,
including racial hate speech in the United States involving U.S. nationals
and having no connection to Germany. Of course, states control whether
and to what degree their courts may enforce universal jurisdiction.
Depending on how their domestic laws view international law, states often
must legislatively implement or "transform" this international legal power
of universal jurisdiction into their national laws so that they might exercise
it in domestic courts. 149 But what is important is that Germany, or any
other state, cannot unilaterally define its universal jurisdiction in relation
to other states, that is to say, the crimes giving rise to such jurisdictionagain, that is exclusively a matter of international law.
Because the crime itself generates jurisdiction, courts must use the
definition of that crime, as prescribed by international law, when
prosecuting on universal jurisdiction grounds; otherwise there is no
jurisdiction. Thus the exercise of universal adjudicative jurisdiction by
states (through their courts) depends fundamentally on the application of
the substantive law of universal prescriptive jurisdiction. And this
substantive law, or the definitions of universal crimes, is a matter of
international law. Where courts invent or exaggerate the definition of the
crime on which they claim universal jurisdiction, their jurisdiction
conflicts with "the very international law upon which it purports to
rely. ' 150 Although universal jurisdiction is a customary international law,
the most accurate and readily available definitions of universal1 51crimes
appear in treaties, which largely embody the customary definitions.
The takeaway for the present thesis is that universal jurisdiction is
foundationally different from national jurisdiction. Its jurisdictional anchor
for states, or source of lawgiving power, is distinctly international-i.e.,

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Colangelo, supra note 143, at 161.
See infra notes 172-73.
Colangelo, supra note 143, at 153.
Id. at 169-82.
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the international legal system's interest in suppressing certain international
crimes no matter where they occur and whom they involve. Furthermore,
when individual states wish to implement their universal jurisdiction
through domestic legislation and enforce it in domestic courts, they are
constrained to determine the crimes they adjudicate as the crimes are
determined under international law. A state may not-as it may when
exercising its nationaljurisdiction-criminalize essentially any activity it
likes in any terms it likes according to its own independent lawgiving
prerogative. The primary lawgiver, rather, is the international legal system,
and individual states exercising universal jurisdiction merely act as
decentralized enforcement vehicles for that lawgiver.
C. Three Rules of InternationalDouble Jeopardy
Based on the foregoing analysis of the international law of jurisdiction,
I want to lay down three basic rules of international double jeopardy:
Rule (1): a national prosecution applying and enforcing a national law
does not erect a bar to successive prosecutions by other states with
national jurisdiction over the crime in question; similarly,
Rule (2): a national prosecution applying and enforcing a national law
that incorporates an international legal prohibition on a universal crime
does not erect a bar to successive prosecutions by other states with
national jurisdiction over the crime in question; however,
Rule (3): a national prosecution applying and enforcing a national law
that incorporates an international legal prohibition on a universal crime
does erect a bar to successive prosecutions that rely only upon
international (i.e., universal) jurisdiction-that is, to successive
prosecutions that lack a recognized national basis for jurisdiction or nexus
to the crime and would be prohibited in the absence of universal
jurisdiction.
To illustrate, suppose a U.S. national is alleged to have committed
torture in Egypt. Clearly Egypt may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction and
may apply Egyptian law proscribing torture to activity committed in its
territory. 152 Under international law, the United States also may exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction and may apply U.S. law proscribing torture to
activity committed by its national. 153 Thus we easily have two states that
potentially may claim jurisdiction under international law. But that is not

152.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 402(1)(a) (1987).
153. See id. § 402(2).
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all. For Spain, among other states, 154 has a universal jurisdiction law that
allows Spanish courts to prosecute for torture, wherever it occurs and
155 So it too conceivably could exercise jurisdiction
whomever it involves.
156
facts.
on these
Now suppose the United States prosecutes this particular individual for
torture using the federal code provision implementing the international
Convention Against Torture 157 (which explicitly provides for jurisdiction
over torture committed outside the United States where, inter alia, "the
alleged offender is a national of the United States"158 ). Is there a double
jeopardy bar to a successive prosecution by Egypt for the same torture?
How about to a successive prosecution by Spain? How about by any other
state in the world with a universal jurisdiction law prohibiting torture?
According to a jurisdictional theory of double jeopardy, if the United
States prosecutes under a U.S. law that incorporates the international
prohibition on torture, Egypt still may prosecute-for the same act of
torture-on an Egyptian law that also incorporates the international
prohibition on torture. 159 The reason, as we know, is that Egypt is an
independent lawgiver with an independent national jurisdiction to apply its
laws to acts taking place within its territory. Hence we have (1) an
application of U.S. law prohibiting torture, and (2) an application of
Egyptian law prohibiting torture. No problem; that is what dual
sovereignty is all about.
What about Spain? Unlike Egypt, it has no national jurisdiction on
these facts. If the crime were instead an "ordinary" crime, say a robbery in
an Egyptian marketplace by a U.S. national, Spain could not apply and

154. See Austria's Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 64(1)

6 (Austria), translated in LUC

REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 94

(2003); Belgium's Code de procbdure p~nale, titre prdliminare, article 12 bis, translatedin REYDAMS,
supra, at 105; Denmark's Straffeloven [Strfl] § 8(1)(5), translated in REYDAMS, supra, at 127;
Germany's Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 6, translated in REYDAMS, supra, at 142; Wet
Internationale Misdrijven (International Crimes Act), Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden
[Stb.] 270 (Netherlands).
155. Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.] 6/1985, B.O.E. 1985, 157.
156. This was precisely Spain's jurisdictional justification for its famous extradition request for
Pinochet.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
158. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(1).
159. Egypt is also a state party to the Torture Convention. See OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT LEGAL
ADVISOR FOR TREATY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (2006), available at

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/66286.pdf. Therefore, it has an obligation to "take
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction." Torture Convention, supranote 157, art. 2.
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enforce Spanish national law over that crime. Rather, for Spain to
prosecute, it must rely uniquely upon its international jurisdiction over the
universal crime of torture. And that is indeed what states claim to do when
they exercise universal jurisdiction. 160 The Spanish national law used to
prosecute is therefore really just a shell, with no self-supporting national
jurisdictional basis, through which Spain applies and enforces
international law. My contention is that because Spain has no independent
national jurisdiction to apply its own national law, but must rely uniquely
on a shared international jurisdiction to apply international law, Spain
would be blocked from prosecuting by the prior U.S. prosecution on a
jurisdictional theory of double jeopardy.
If we were to stop right here, the argument might not be entirely
convincing-especially to those who tend to favor increased use of
universal jurisdiction and who support international criminal tribunals that
purport to apply, and base their jurisdiction in, international law 161 (a
phenomenon I will discuss in light of my thesis in the next Part 162). Such a
reader might respond that even if Spain has no national jurisdiction, it
surely has an international jurisdiction to prosecute for the torture in
question. After all, that is what universal jurisdiction is all about. Put
another way, why can't we have: (1) an application of U.S. law prohibiting
torture; (2) an application of Egyptian law prohibiting torture; and (3) an
application of international law (by Spanish courts) prohibiting torture?
There seem to be three separate laws deriving from three separate sources
of lawgiving power, and that would justify three separate prosecutions
under a jurisdictional theory.
Yet such a response would not be quite right, for the reason that by
prosecuting under a U.S. law that incorporates the international prohibition
on torture, the United States simultaneously applies and enforces both U.S.
national law and international law. And this application and enforcement
of international law operates to block the Spanish proceedings since Spain
is jurisdictionally constrained to apply and enforce that same law, i.e.,
international law. We are left, in other words, with the paradigmatic
double jeopardy protection: you 163
cannot be prosecuted for the same
offense, under the same law, twice.
But my argument still may look lacking to the rigorous supporter of
what I have labeled international jurisdiction, whether it is exercised by

160. See supranotes 145-47.
161. Sadat, supra note 140, at 251.
162.

See infra Part IV.D.

163. See, e.g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1907).
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universal jurisdiction courts or international tribunals. Indeed we already
have posited that the U.S. law is identical to the Egyptian law, and we
would allow Egypt to prosecute successively. So why not allow Spain (or
an international tribunal) to prosecute using international law? That is to
say, we still seem to have three separate laws-(1) U.S., (2) Egyptian, and
(3) international-so why not allow three separate prosecutions? Who's to
say that the United States necessarily applies and enforces international
law in addition to its national law so as to block the Spanish proceedings?
We seem to be stuck in a sort of metaphysical quagmire with no
apparent way out apart from academic fiat. Either the United States applies
and enforces international law along with its national law or it does not. I
can say it does as much as I like, but that would just be my saying so with
no principled reason supporting my conclusion. To pull ourselves out of
this quagmire we must return to what we mean by the term "sovereign" in
the double jeopardy context; namely, the sovereign as independent
lawgiver.
We are clear that within this meaning of sovereign the United States is
one sovereign and Egypt is another. Each has an independent jurisdiction
to prescribe law with respect to certain national entitlements, primary
among them entitlements over national territory and persons. Moreover,
each has some centralized legislative or lawgiving body that formally
performs this function. Because we have independent lawgivers, we have
independent laws that proscribe independent offenses, even if facially the
laws and the offenses look the same. As a result, an individual may be
prosecuted under an identical-looking law for an identical-looking offense
multiple times because the two offenses are, by virtue of the multiple
sources of lawgiving authority
proscribing them, in fact separate-each
164
against a different sovereign.
But now we turn to international law. Where is the sovereign, the
lawgiver? It is certainly nothing so formal and centralized as the U.S.
Congress or the Egyptian parliament. There is no overarching international
legislature that hands down laws for all the world to obey. Rather, the
international lawmaking process occurs mainly by aggregating the
interactions of single actors in the international system-individual nationstates. 165 It is made either through treaty, whereby individual states create
and bind themselves to rules by signing and ratifying international legal

164. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985).
165. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 323 (1967).
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instruments, 166 or through custom, which, to borrow one popular
definition, "results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." 167 Now the United
States, like every state, is part of the international lawmaking collective. It
is also part of the international law-applying and law-enforcing
collective. 168 Thus when the United States prosecutes a torturer, and that
prosecution incorporates international law, the United States applies and
enforces international, as well as national, law. There is, in other words, no
independent "international sovereign" in the way that there would be an
independent national sovereign in the government of Egypt. Rather the
"sovereignty," or lawgiving and applying power, of the international legal
system is invariably bound up in the individual states that make and apply
international law in decentralized fashion, of which the United States is
one.
Where the United States applies the international prohibition on torture
in its courts, Spain cannot then come along and claim itself to be the
international law-enforcer if the United States already has performed that
function. It is conceptually no different than someone being prosecuted in
the Second Circuit under a federal law, and then the same person being
prosecuted in the Ninth Circuit for the same offense under the same
federal law. Such a prosecution plainly would be barred by the prohibition
on double jeopardy, 169 and the doctrine of dual sovereignty cannot pretend
to save it.
A final question perhaps of more practical than theoretical concern is
how to tell whether a national court has, in fact, applied and enforced
international law so as to block future universal jurisdiction prosecutions
by other states. Assuming for the moment a good faith prosecution and a
fair procedure designed to achieve justice, 170 I would submit that where
the law upon which a national prosecution is based reflects the core
international substance and definition of the crime-and again, treaty law
171
ordinarily will supply the best markerY
-the
national prosecution
enforces international law. Depending on how states view international
law, some may claim to apply it directly through their courts while others
will implement it via national legislation into a domestic rule of decision.

166.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 102(3), 301 (1987).
167. Id.§ 102(2).
168.

KELSEN, supra note 165, at 323.

169. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1907).
170. I deal with the possibility of sham trials infra Part V.E.
171. See supra note 151.

802

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

86:769

Thus in the U.S. context we can be fairly confident that where a federal
code provision implements U.S. treaty obligations to criminalize at the
national level certain internationally proscribed conduct, and that code
provision tracks faithfully the definition of the crime as set forth in the
treaty (which U.S. code provisions tend to do), 172 a good faith prosecution
under the code in U.S. court will have applied the international legal
prohibition to the conduct in question. Civil law countries, by contrast,
often have more general enabling clauses
173 that allow courts to apply and
enforce international law more directly.
The reflexive objection that there inevitably will be variation from state
to state on the precise definition of, say, torture or crimes against
humanity, fails to appreciate fully the decentralized and organic nature of
the international legal system. There will of course be variation, but some
margin of appreciation 174 in enforcing international law is probably
unavoidable given how decentralized enforcement of international law
actually works: through states' national laws and procedures. Indeed, even
in the far more centralized U.S. system, if there is a circuit split as to the
definition of a federal offense with different circuits adopting different
interpretations, it does not follow that a defendant may be prosecuted
multiple times for that same offense by different courts sitting in
disagreeing circuits. 175 And while there is no ultimate appeals court in the
international system like the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve definitional
disagreements, 176 states have other ways of resolving international legal
conflicts, 177 the outcome of which will only help further to determine
the
178
definition in dispute as a matter of customary international law.
In fact, and as I will explain in more depth in the next Part, 179 this sort
of national enforcement of international law appears to be exactly what the

172. See Colangelo, supranote 143, at 189-201.
173. See, e.g., Belgium's Code de proc6dure p6nale, titre prdliminare, article 12 bis, translatedin
REYDAMS, supra note 154, at 105; Colangelo, supranote 135, at 175-77 & nn.82-91.
174. The margin of appreciation doctrine was first developed by the European Court of Human
Rights and accords leeway to national governments in implementing international legal obligations.
Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 408 (1960-1961). For discussion of its application to
international criminal law, see Jenia Jontcheva Turner, NationalizingInternationalCriminal Law, 41
STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 30-31 (2005).
175. For an example of such a split, compare United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597 (9th Cir.
2007), with United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986) (differing interpretations for
whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) requires that explosives be carried not only "during"
a felony as per the statute, but also "in relation to" that felony).
176. See United States v. Ressam, 128 S. Ct. 1858 (2008) (resolving circuit split supranote 175).
177. Colangelo, supra note 143, at 183-85.
178. Id.
179.

See infra Part IV.D.
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double jeopardy provisions of international tribunal statutes have in mind.
The provisions protect an individual from a successive tribunal
prosecution where that individual previously has been tried in good faith
for the same criminal act in national court. 180 The prior national court
prosecution already would have enforced international law over the act in
question, thus precluding the tribunal from enforcing that same law again.
But there is an exception to this double jeopardy bar, one that is very
telling in light of the discussion above: the tribunal may well prosecute
again where "the act for which [the individual] was tried was characterized
as an ordinary crime" 181-in other words, where the national prosecution
did not use the international substance and definition of the crime, and
thus did not enforce international law.
Before showing how the rules above explain international law and
practice, I want to drive home the argument with a frequently
misunderstood international law opinion by the Supreme Court from 1820,
the same year the concurrent jurisdiction language relating to federal and
state prosecutions first appeared in Court's jurisprudence. United States v.
Furlong182 has been misread and miscited by leading commentators as
contrary to the dual sovereignty doctrine of double jeopardy. 183 Yet
Furlong in fact supports the doctrine under a certain explanatory theoryspecifically, the jurisdictional theory just articulated.
The relevant portion of the opinion addresses in dicta the question of
double jeopardy in respect of the international crime of piracy on the one
hand and the parochial crime of murder on the other. Piracy, as a result of
a legal fiction of the time, was outside the national jurisdiction of any
state; 184 by its very definition no state had national jurisdiction over piracy

180.

See infra Part IV.D.

181. See infra note 295 (quoting the ICTY and ICTR statutes) (emphasis added).
182. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
183. See Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 5, at 809 & n.55 (citing Furlong when stating that
"federal courts were not to try an individual for a crime for which that individual already had been
prosecuted by another sovereign"); Amar & Marcus, supra note 5, at 26-27 & n.141 (citing Furlong
when stating that "[i]f England would allow a French judgment to bar retrial, so should America");
Franck, supra note 5, at 1098-99. One notable exception is Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 111, 144 (2004), who reads the double jeopardy language in the opinion to apply, in my view
correctly, to prosecutions over piracy based on universal jurisdiction.
184. See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820); Colangelo, supra note
135, at 144; see, e.g., Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). To ensure that
pirates were prosecuted wherever they were found and assertions of jurisdiction over them occasioned
no interference with the sovereignty of other states, pirates were deemed outside of any state's national
jurisdiction; see also Justice Scalia's more recent description in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 748 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). Absent the fiction, prosecution of a pirate in custody for
acts occurring outside the prosecuting state's territory theoretically could infringe another state's
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since the perpetrators were stateless individuals on stateless vessels
(ominously flying the black flag instead of a national flag). 185 According
to the Court, pirates "were persons on board vessels which throw off their
national character by cruizing piratically and committing piracy on other
vessels. ' 186 Piracy was not "committed against the particular sovereignty
of a foreign power; but ... against all nations, including the United
States." 187 All states had jurisdiction over piracy not as a matter of their
national jurisdiction, but under a "universal jurisdiction" (the Court's
term) resulting from the crime's prohibition under the law of nations,
which all states could enforce. 188 Murder, by contrast, was an ordinary
crime over which each state had national jurisdiction where the crime
occurred in its territory
or, in some cases, where it involved the state's
189
sea.
at
nationals
Just as in the federal system, the existence of double jeopardy
protection in the international system with respect to these two crimes
rested explicitly on concepts of jurisdiction. The Court explained that
piracy "is considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all
nations. It is against all, and punished by all; and there can be no doubt
that the plea of autrefois acquit [already acquitted] would be good in any
civilized State, though resting on a prosecution instituted in the Courts of
any other civilized State." 190 A number of commentators have taken this
language to suggest that double jeopardy among sovereigns was prohibited
under U.S. and international law back in 1820 before the full development
of the dual sovereignty doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 19 1 But in
so doing they must have failed to read the very next sentence of the
opinion, which continues: "Not so with the crime of murder. 1 92 For
murder, unlike piracy, was not an offense under international law "within
th[e] universal jurisdiction" of all states, but rather was an offense against
each state's national law1 93: "It is punishable under the laws of each State,

sovereignty; specifically, the state (or state's vessel) where the act occurred because, at the time,
jurisdiction was strictly territorial in nature and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was seen as
interfering with the sovereignty of the state where the crime occurred.
185. See generally DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE
REALITY OF LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES (1995).
186. Klintock, 18 U.S. at 153; see also United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. 412, 417-19 (1820).
187. Klintock, 18 U.S. at 152.
188. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See supranote 183.
192. Furlong, 18 U.S. at 197.
193. Id.
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and [therefore] an acquittal in [the defendant's]
case would not have been
'1 94
a good plea in the Court of Great Britain."
The Court went on to explain that the United States had what we have
been calling national jurisdiction over murder committed by U.S. citizens
at sea: "[A]s to our own citizens ... [U.S.] laws follow[] them every
where"; 195 and that the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause protected
these individuals from successive prosecutions by the U.S. government:
"[Iln our own Courts they are secured by the constitution from being twice
put in jeopardy of life or member .... ,19 6 However, the protection did not
shield them against successive prosecutions by other states with national
jurisdiction over the offense: "[I]f [the accused] are also made amenable to
the laws of another State,197it is the result of their own act in subjecting
themselves to those laws."
Thus as long ago as 1820, the Supreme Court articulated a theory of
international double jeopardy moored in doctrines of jurisdiction and the
autonomous lawgiving power of the sovereign. Under this theory, to
continue the Court's hypothetical, where the United States and Great
Britain had independent bases of national jurisdiction over a particular act,
multiple prosecutions were permissible. But where no distinctly national
jurisdiction authorized prosecution, where the United States sought to
prosecute upon its universal jurisdiction to enforce the international law
against piracy, a double jeopardy plea would have been available in the
courts of another state exercising that same, shared universal jurisdiction
to enforce that same international prohibition. 198 In the next Part I show
that this theory continues to explain modern international law and practice.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
This Part uses the jurisdictional theory to explain the existence and
contours of double jeopardy protections in various areas of international
law and practice. It evaluates double jeopardy protections in the
international law of human rights and humanitarian law, extradition and
cooperation, the statutes of international criminal tribunals, and the
practice of universal jurisdiction by states. The discussion will show that
the three rules of international double jeopardy articulated above

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197-98.
Id.
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persuasively explain modern international law and practice relating to
double jeopardy.
A. Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw
A main justification, if not the main justification, for double jeopardy
protection is to guarantee the rights of individuals to be free from
successive prosecutions for the same crime. 199 It is not surprising,
therefore, that international human rights law contains double jeopardy
protections, as does the related field of international humanitarian law,
which protects the rights of individuals in situations of armed conflict.
However, double jeopardy protection in these areas has a notably limited
scope: it attaches only to multiple prosecutions or punishments within a
single state. In other words, the relevant international human rights and
humanitarian law instruments permit a state to prosecute an individual for
a crime for which that individual already has been prosecuted and
punished in another state. The jurisdictional theory explains this lack of
international double jeopardy protection among different states since,
under the theory, each state as an independent lawgiver may exercise its
national jurisdiction to apply and enforce its own laws.
1. Universal Human Rights Instruments
Article 14(7) of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees: "No one shall be liable to be tried or
punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally
convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of
each country." 200 As the language of the provision seems to suggest, the
prohibition on double jeopardy applies only within "each" state's judicial
system. 20 1 The drafting history of the provision explicitly supports this
interpretation, 20 2 and the quasi-judicial Human Rights Committee, whose
job it is to interpret and implement the Convention, 20 3 has made clear that

199. See infra Part V.A.
200. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(7), openedfor signatureDec. 16,
1966, S. ExEc. Doc. E 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
201. At least one court has adopted such a plain language reading of the article. See United States
v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000).
202. See MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUXPRPARATOIRES' OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 316 (1987) ("It was pointed out that a State would be
free to try, in accordance with its laws, persons already sentenced for the same offence by the courts of
another country.").
203. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor
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the scope of Article 14(7)'s double jeopardy protection is limited to
multiple prosecutions by one state.20 4
The leading Committee ruling on the issue involved a complaint by an
Italian citizen who had been convicted in Switzerland of money laundering
and was then prosecuted for the same offense in Italy. The complaint
alleged that the successive Italian prosecution violated Article 14(7)'s
double jeopardy bar.20 5 The Italian government rejected this idea of
"international non bis in idem" and argued that Article 14(7) instead "must
be understood as referring exclusively to the relationships between judicial
20 6
decisions of a single State and not between those of different States."
The Committee agreed, and in language mirroring that used to articulate
the jurisdictional theory presented above, explained that "article 14,
paragraph 7, of the Covenant... does not guarantee non his in indem [sic]
with regard to the nationaljurisdictions of two or more States.... [T]his
provision prohibits double jeopardy only with regard to an offence
adjudicated in a given State." 20 7 Subsequent Human Rights Committee
decisions have affirmed this interpretation, 20 8 and it has been adopted as
well by cases in national courts interpreting the Covenant.20 9
2. Regional Human Rights Instruments
Regional human rights instruments containing a bar on double jeopardy
likewise limit its application to multiple prosecutions by a single state.
Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Freedoms, for example, restricts double jeopardy
protection as follows: "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again
in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an
offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.''210 And if the
language itself were not adequately clear that double jeopardy protection

signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
204. A.P. v. Italy, Communication No. 204/1986, Report of the Human Rights Comm., 43d Sess.,
supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988); A.R.J. v. Australia, Communication No. 692/1996, Human
Rights Comm., U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996 (July 28, 1997)..
205. A.P. v. Italy, U.N. Doc. A/43/40, 1-2.3.
206. Id. 5.3.
207. Id. 7.3 (emphasis added).
208. See A.R.J. v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996, 6.4.
209. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1286-89 (11th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1363-64 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
210. Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. 117 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1988)
(emphasis added).
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does not extend to prosecutions by multiple national jurisdictions, the
Council of Europe's Explanatory Report erases all doubt: "The words
'under the jurisdiction of the same State' limit the application of the article
to the national level. '211 Again, it is the concept of jurisdiction that
demarcates double jeopardy protection: where there
212 are multiple national
jurisdictions, there may be multiple prosecutions.
3. HumanitarianLaw Instruments

International humanitarian law also contains rules limiting double
jeopardy. Article 86 to the 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War directs that "No prisoner of war may be
punished more than once for the same act or on the same charge. 213
Although the article was approved "unanimously without comment," 214 its
language suffers from a number of lacunae. Does it protect only against
multiple punishments and not trials? And more importantly for this
Article, does it apply only to multiple punishments doled out by one state
party or does it attach across multiple states?
The drafting history suggests that the provision applies only to multiple
punishments by one state, explaining that it was included "to prevent any
recurrence of certain abuses committed during the Second World War in
penal matters. 2 15 The "abuses" are referenced in an additional paragraph
proposed by the Sub-Committee on Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions,
elaborating that "[t]he punishment inflicted at the first trial shall not be
increased as the result of an appeal or a similar procedure." 216 Thus it
appears that Article 86 was intended to protect against additional
punishment being heaped on as a result of exercising one's right to
"appeal or petition from any sentence," a right which is guaranteed by

211. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/
Html/1 17.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009); see also P. VAN DIJK AND G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 513 (1990).

212. The American Convention on Human Rights also contains a double jeopardy prohibition. See
American Convention on Human Rights art. 8(4), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123.
213. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 86, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135.
214. Commentary to Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Aug. 12,
1949), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM375-590105?OpenDocument.
215. Id.
216. Id.; see 2A FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 326,

501 (Hein 2004).
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Article 106.217 Consequently, the provision relates only to multiple
punishments exacted by one state party.
Subsequent international instruments more directly spell out the scope
of double jeopardy protection in modern humanitarian law and expressly
cabin it to multiple prosecutions by the same state party. Article 75(4)(h)
to the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions guarantees
that "[n]o one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an
offence in respect of which a final judgement acquitting or convicting that
person has been previously pronounced under the same law and judicial
procedure."2 18 The narrowness of this protection is consistent with that
afforded by Article 14(7) of the ICCPR. Indeed, according to the
Additional Protocol's Official Rapporteur, "The provision on ne bis in
idem [in Protocol I] is drawn from the United Nations Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. 2 19
Thus, while human rights and humanitarian law instruments create
rights against double jeopardy, the instruments self-consciously limit the
scope of those rights to prohibit only multiple prosecutions by a single
state. The jurisdictional theory explains why.
B. InternationalCooperation
One area of international law in which individuals clearly are protected
from successive prosecutions by different states, at least in some
circumstances, is the law of extradition and cooperation in criminal
matters. If the legal instruments in this area reflect a general prohibition on
international double jeopardy they would cut against a jurisdictional
theory of double jeopardy whereby states with independent jurisdiction to
prescribe law always retain the independent ability to enforce that law
through a separate prosecution in their courts.
1. Extradition
Extradition treaties uniformly contain mandatory grounds for refusal of
extradition where the requested individual already has been convicted or
acquitted of the offense that serves as the basis of the extradition request in

217. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supranote 213, art. 106.
218. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 75(4)(h), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1979) (emphasis added).
219. YVES SANDOZ ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 884 (1987).
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the state to which the request is directed. For example, the European
Convention on Extradition states that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if
final judgment has been passed by the competent authorities of the
requested Party upon the person claimed in respect of the offence or
offences for which extradition is requested., 22 The United Nations Model
Treaty on Extradition similarly provides that extradition "shall not be
granted... [i]f there has been a final judgment rendered against the person
in the requested State in respect of the offence for which the person's
extradition is requested., 22 1 In fact, "[w]ith two exceptions, all United
States extradition treaties negotiated since World War II contain
provisions prohibiting the extradition of persons convicted, acquitted, or
being tried in the requested country
for the same acts or offenses for which
222
requested.,
is
extradition
their
The consistency of these provisions throughout the majority of modem
extradition treaties brings the international lawyer to a bit of a dilemma.
The dilemma centers on the role of treaties in the international legal
schema. On the one hand, treaties may be either generative or declarative
of an underlying international law;223 on the other hand, they may carve
out an exception to that law for the particular states parties to the treaty.
For instance, the Genocide Convention establishes the international law
against genocide-a law that applies generally to all states; 224 while a
treaty setting up a trade regime like the WTO creates rights and
obligations only for those specific states parties to the treaty-against the
background of a far more relaxed or even disinterested general
international law that by and large permits states to trade how they see fit.
The question we must answer is whether the double jeopardy
provisions in extradition treaties are generative of an international law
prohibiting double jeopardy across the board, i.e., across state borders, or
whether these treaties merely carve out an exception for states parties to
the treaties against an otherwise permissive international law that allows
multiple prosecutions by different states. Two possible arguments, only
one of which withstands scrutiny, tend to support the answer that the
protection contained in the treaties is the exception, not the rule.

220.
221.

European Convention on Extradition art. 9, Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 274.
See U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, art. 3(d) U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,

68th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (Dec. 14, 1990).
222.

MICHAEL ABBELL, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES § 3-2(19), at 113-14

(2004).
223. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41
(Feb. 20).
224. See D'Amato, Human Rights, supranote 121, at 1128-48.
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The first argument, and the one that in my view ultimately must fail,
takes extradition treaties as a class and contends that because they are
designed to create exceptions, the rules they contain are also exceptional.
Extradition treaties depart from the general international rule that states
have no obligation to extradite.22 5 In fact the domestic laws of many states,
including the United States, prohibit extradition in the absence of an
extradition treaty. 226 Thus the entire purpose of an extradition treaty is to
hew an exception; to create obligations and rights for states parties that
they otherwise would not have under international law. One could argue
that the exceptional character of the treaty's overall object and purpose
might make awkward the conclusion that a specific provision incidental to
that object and purpose-such as a provision relating to double jeopardysomehow extends to non-party states as a general rule of international law.
If the overall obligation to extradite is non-generalizable, neither are its
incidentals.
But this type of intrapolation from the overall character of extradition
treaties runs into a strong human rights objection. The reason for the
double jeopardy bar ostensibly would be to protect the individual from
states contracting away her rights through the treaty; "from combining to
do together what each could not.., do on its own." 227 Thus if extradition
is the exception to the general rule, human rights are the exception to the
exception: states may create whatever rules they like amongst themselves,
except rules that violate fundamental human rights. Hence the Torture
Convention's firm command: "No State Party shall ... extradite a person
to another State where substantial grounds exist for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 228
This brings us to the second, more persuasive reason why the double
jeopardy protection contained in extradition treaties is the exception, not a
generalizable international rule. Unlike the Torture Convention's absolute
prohibition on extradition where there is good reason to believe that the
requested individual will be tortured upon transfer, extradition treaties by
their own terms restrict the double jeopardy bar to states parties. 229 And

225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 475
cmt. 1 (1987).
226. Id. § 475 cmt. b.
227. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 102 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
228. Torture Convention, supra note 157, art. 3(1). For its part, the European Court of Human
Rights has observed that extradition where substantial grounds exist to believe that the extradited
individual will be subject to torture gives rise to state liability under the European Convention's
prohibition on torture. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 91 (1989).
229.

See M.

CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
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even here it applies only to one narrow set of circumstances in the vast
majority of the treaties23 : extradition shall be refused, it will be recalled,
only where there has been
a final judgment rendered against the individual
231
in the "requestedState."
But what about where the individual already has been convicted or
acquitted in the requesting state, and is likely to be subject to yet another
prosecution for the same offense upon return? Or has already been
convicted or acquitted in a third state? The overwhelming majority of
extradition treaties are manifestly silent232; and the silence is not
accidental. Rather it evinces two interrelated points about the treaties: (1)
they do not purport to establish an unqualified right to be free from double
jeopardy-often even among states parties; and (2) their double jeopardy
provisions certainly were not intended to be generalizable to states outside
the treaty.
The German Constitutional Court addressed precisely these points
when a fugitive in Germany challenged his pending extradition to Turkey
on the grounds that he had already been convicted, and had served his
time, for the offense in question in Greece.233 Surveying the relevant
international instruments and evaluating state practice on the point, the
Court concluded categorically:
There is presently no general rule of public international law that
states that a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment in a
third state and has also served this sentence is unable to be retried or
reconvicted for the same offence in another state. ... Similarly,
there is presently no general rule of public international law
opposing the permissibility of extradition when the person sought
has already been imprisoned for the same offence in a third state
and this time is not accounted for or taken into consideration by the
state seeking extradition.234

PRACTICE 693 & n.332 (4th ed. 2004); Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supranote 13, at 785.
230. See sources cited supra notes 220-22.

231.

See, e.g.,
U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 221; European Convention on

Extradition, supra note 220, art. 9.
232. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 229, at 693 & n.332; Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note

13, at 785.
233. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 7, 1987, 75
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 1 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.utexas.

edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work new/german/case.php?id=570.
234. Id. at C (intro.).
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The Court continued (the emphasis is in the original):
[T]he principle of ne bis in idem is a general rule of public
international law ... which prevents the renewed conviction of a

person sought for the same offence in the same state. On the other
hand, there are currently no general rules of public international law
... according to which no one may be tried or punished by the

courts of one state for an offence for which he has already been
convicted or acquitted by another state or that a sentence served
abroad must be accounted for
in the former state or be taken into
235
consideration in sentencing.
The double jeopardy provisions in extradition treaties do not evidence a
general international prohibition on double jeopardy as among different
states. Instead these provisions merely carve out an exception to the
general rule allowing double jeopardy among multiple sovereigns. This
exception, viewed with even a modest degree of skepticism given its
particularly narrow coverage, may not have much to do at all with the
individual's rights when compared with another, apparently more salient
motivation: the requested state's sovereign interest in not seeing its own
proceedings repeated, questioned, or overturned by foreign courts.
2. Other CooperationConventions
The survey of law in this area would not be complete without
discussing a few attempts among European states to set up regimes of
mutual respect of criminal judgments and coordination in criminal matters.
Each of the agreements behind these regimes contains some form of
double jeopardy protection. But these too recognize that the (limited)
protection they afford is the exception and not the rule. The Council of
Europe's 1970 Convention on the International Validity of Criminal
Judgments236 and 1972 Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in
Criminal Matters 237 provide a double jeopardy protection based on a final
judgment in another member state's courts.238 The Explanatory Report to

235. Id. at C(2)(a)(3).
236. European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, Europ. T.S. No.
70 (entered into force May 28, 1970).
237. European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, Europ. T.S. No.
73 (entered into force May 15, 1972).
238. See European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, supra note
236, art. 53; European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, supranote 237,
art. 35.
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the Judgments Convention observes that the protection afforded is-and
was intended to be-an exception to the general permissibility of
international double jeopardy. It notes that while national systems
generally prohibit double jeopardy, "[a]t the international level, on 239
the
other hand, the principle of ne bis in idem is not generally recognised.,
Moreover, the Council of Europe deliberately included the
international double jeopardy clause in a convention dealing with
cooperation between states parties as opposed to incorporating it by
protocol into the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. It did so out of concern that placing it in the
latter would signal, wrongly, a wider application to non-party states
unsupported by international law. 240 And even this watered-down double
jeopardy protection failed to take hold because most Council of Europe
members did not ratify the conventions. 24 1 More recently (and more
successfully), the European Union put into effect the 1990 Schengen
Convention 242 in anticipation of lifting the internal border controls in
1993.243 But like the two Council of Europe conventions above, the
Schengen Convention is an instrument of cooperation intended to carve
out an exception to the general rule.
Finally, the scope of the protection itself in these instruments makes
clear that it is exceptional and, moreover, aligns strongly with a
jurisdictional theory in which national jurisdiction is based on distinct
national entitlements. The bar on successive prosecutions in each of the
cooperation conventions notably does not extend to prosecutions by states
having jurisdiction on the basis of either territoriality or a variation of the
protective principle.244 Under the conventions, a state on whose territory
the offense occurred or against whose public institutions or persons the
offense was directed always retains the power to prosecute in the face of a
foreign judgment.2 45 Thus even while carving out an exception to

239. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Convention on the International Validity of
Criminal Judgments pt. III, § 1, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/070.
Htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
240. Id.
241. Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 787.
242. Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the Governments
of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French
Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 84
[hereinafter Schengen Convention].
243. Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 787.
244. See European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, supra note
236, art. 53(2), (3); European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, supra
note 237, art. 35(2), (3); Schengen Convention, supranote 242, art. 55.
245. See supra note 244; see also Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Convention on
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international double jeopardy that prevents successive prosecutions by
different states, the power to make, apply, and enforce law with respect to
some entitlements-namely, those relating to national territory and
security-was too valuable for states parties to give up.
In all, extradition treaties and other international cooperation
agreements self-consciously operate within a jurisdictional theory of
double jeopardy. These instruments deliberately carve out limited
exceptions for states parties to a general international rule allowing
multiple prosecutions by multiple lawgivers with independent power to
make and apply law.
C. GeneralPrinciples of InternationalLaw
Even where states have not affirmatively undertaken to establish a
double jeopardy protection at the international level through treaty law,
their domestic practices may, to borrow a phrase from the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, give rise to "[a] general principle[] of law
recognized by civilized nations." 246 General principles constitute
"supplementary rules of international law., 247 While international courts
and tribunals have on numerous occasions looked to general principles 248
to
"fill in the gaps" left by the primary source law like treaties and custom,
the proper formulation and application of these principles is much
contested.24 9 We need not wade too far into the complexity of exactly
when and how a principle common among domestic legal systems may be
recruited into a general principle of international law in order to conclude
that no such generally accepted principle exists with respect to double
jeopardy among states.
1. The Hierarchy of Sources Hurdle
Before we get to the domestic practice, any general principle in this
area faces a preliminary stumbling block. Their main role as gap-fillers in
the international jurisprudence could suggest that general principles cannot

the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, supra note 239.
246.

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179; 59

Stat. 1055; T.S. No. 993.
247.

(1987).
248.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(4)

OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50-55 (1991); see also

Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A Judgment (Oct. 7, 1997); BIN CHENG, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1993).
249. See SCHACHTER, supranote 248, at 50-55.
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supplant an inconsistent rule established by primary international law
sources like treaties. Primary sources represent the affirmative and
deliberate consent of states to a rule that binds them on the international
plane. By contrast, a general principle taken from the domestic practices of
states has no such international imprimatur. As a matter of the hierarchy of
sources, the fact that the relevant primary source instruments purposefully
limit their provisions so as not to create a generally applicable double
jeopardy rule among states at the international level tends to undermine
the proposition of this same rule arising (and overriding the primary
source rule) through a supplemental rule of international law, and one that
derives from the practices of states in their domestic spheres to boot. One
might think of the treaties as having "occupied the field ' 250 here in a way
that cabins quite conspicuously the rule so as not to prohibit international
double jeopardy. Indeed, apart from stating flatly, "[t]here is no general
protection from double jeopardy among different states"-which the
drafting history and decisional law actually do-it is not clear what else
the treaties themselves might have done to limit the scope of double
jeopardy protection to successive prosecutions by a single state.
There is, however, a rejoinder. By extending double jeopardy
protection beyond the single state scenario to reach multiple prosecutions
by different states, the general principle has played precisely its role: it has
"supplement[ed],, 251 not displaced, the primary source rule. And
moreover, this practice is, by definition, not limited solely to the domestic
practices of states; recognizing and enforcing an international double
jeopardy protection in domestic courts is tantamount to recognizing and
enforcing the criminal judgments of foreign states, 252 so there is some
international dimension here indicative of custom.
Yet the fact remains that an international rule covering exactly this
multiple-state scenario was expressly considered-and rejected-by the
primary international lawmaking instruments directly addressed to the
issue, leading to the conclusion that the states involved, even while
engaged in the very business of crafting human rights,253 did not want to
be bound by a double jeopardy rule at the international level. In any event,

250. This is a term of art used by the United States Supreme Court in evaluating the federal
government's power to preempt the states in areas of federal lawmaking. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
251. See supranote 247 and accompanying text.
252. On the civil side, the doctrine of res judicata appears to have been accepted for some time as
a general principle of international law. See Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
19, at 27 (July 26) (Judge Anzilotti) (cited in CHENG, supranote 248, at 336).
253. See supranotes 200-19.
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and whatever one thinks about the right answer to the sources conundrum,
domestic practice on the point is so mixed that no principle responsibly
can be deduced.
2. InternationalDouble JeopardyProtectionsin National Law
Without doubt, most states' domestic laws contain some type of double
jeopardy protection,254 whether through constitutional guarantee255 or by
statutory or common law rule.256 Our question is whether the protection
attaches in light of prior prosecutions by foreign courts.
a. Common Law Countries
Practice in common law countries is sharply divided. U.S. law on the
point is clear: the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment covers
only multiple prosecutions by the same sovereign; 25 7 thus different

prosecutions by different sovereigns,
258

including foreign states, are

permissible.
As one court succinctly put it, "[t]he Constitution of the
United States has not adopted the doctrine of international double
jeopardy. '25 9 On the other hand, common law countries like Canada 260 and
England 261 offer a more comprehensive protection that shields defendants
from international double jeopardy in most cases 262 where judgment

254. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 154, 155 n.2 (Black, J., dissenting).
255. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
InternationalProceduralProtections and Equivalent Protectionsin National Constitutions,3 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 289 & n.262 (1993).
256.

See JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL

POLICY 125 (1969); Gary di Bianco, Truly Constitutional? The American Double Jeopardy Clause and
its AustralianAnalogies, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123 (1995).
257. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 131-33.
258. See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Richardson, 580 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Martin, 574 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Rashed, 83 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 1999); United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d
1361 (S.D. Fla. 1998), aff'd, 208 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2000).
259. Martin, 574 F.2d at 1360.
260. See, e.g., R. v. Leskiw, Morgan and Eedy, [1986] 26 C.C.C. (3d) 166. The Canadian
Supreme Court has left the issue open. See also R. v. Van Rassel, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 225 (Can.) (giving
the arguments for and against an international double jeopardy prohibition, but concluding that "it is
not necessary to decide in this case which of these two positions should prevail").
261. See Treacy v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 562 (H.L.) (Judgment of Lord
Diplock).
262. For an exception, see R. v. Thomas (Keith), [1985] Q.B. 604, in which a British court of
appeals acknowledged the international prohibition on double jeopardy but refused to apply it to a
defendant who had been convicted in absentia in Italy and could not be extradited to Italy on the
grounds that he was never (and would never be) truly twice in "jeopardy."
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already has been handed down by a foreign "court of competent
263
jurisdiction.,
b. Civil Law Countries
The practice of civil law countries runs the gamut between these two
poles of total international double jeopardy protection or none at all. Some
states like Germany 264 and Italy 265 appear to fall into the U.S. camp and
provide no international double jeopardy protection,266 while Dutch law
operates similarly to that of England and Canada in that a valid foreign
judgment broadly shields the accused from a successive Dutch prosecution
for the same offense.2 67
The rest of civil law practice is somewhere in between. Apart from the
Netherlands, no civil law country appears to permit a double jeopardy
claim where the offense takes place within its territory. 268 Thus, as with
the double jeopardy provisions in the cooperation conventions discussed
above, 269 if John commits crime X on State A's territory, he will always be
subject to prosecution in State A, even if he already has been convicted or
acquitted of X in the courts of State B. Again, this practice should not be
all that surprising. A state's entitlement to exercise jurisdiction over its
territory is one of the most important and jealously guarded in the package
of entitlements that makes the state a state. 270 Furthermore, in addition to
preserving their territorial jurisdictions, many states retain the
unconditional power to prosecute where the offense takes place
extraterritorially and affects an important national interest or governmental
function under the protective principle. 271 For example, if John
counterfeits French currency he will always be subject to prosecution in
France, even if he perpetrated the act in the United States and was already
prosecuted for it in U.S. courts.272

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See R. v. Leskiw, Morgan and Eedy, 26 C.C.C. (3d) 172.
See Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 1281, 1293-95.
Id. at 1296.
See Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 784.
Id. at 783 & n.18.

268. Id.at 782.

269. See supraPart IV.B.2.
270.

See supraPart IJI.B.
See Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supranote 13, at 784; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(3) cmt. f (1987); I. CAMERON, THE
PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 84-89 (1994).
272. See Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 784.

271.
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Outside of the absolute retentions of jurisdiction over crimes affecting
territory and nationhood, some civil law countries do afford defendants a
degree of double jeopardy protection based on a foreign prosecution. For
instance, Belgium offers double jeopardy protection where the offense
takes place entirely outside Belgium and the state on whose territory the
offense occurs has rendered a final judgment. 273 Thus Belgium essentially
respects the strength of the other state's jurisdictional entitlement if
Belgium's own entitlement is not as strong. In John's case, if Belgium is
State B (the state exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction) and John already
has been convicted or acquitted in State A (the territorial state), Belgium
will respect State A's judgment and afford double jeopardy protection to
74
2

John.

The splintered practice among the world's domestic legal systems
confirms the Opinion of Advocate General Mayras in the European Court
of Justice, who, after surveying the domestic laws and practices of a
number of European states, concluded that state practice was against a
general principle of international double jeopardy and therefore "the non
bis in idem rule, which is stated and applied in domestic law, is far from
being accepted as a general principle of law in international relations. 2 75
The absence of a general principle of international law prohibiting
successive prosecutions by different states is consistent with a
jurisdictional theory under which different states with independent
national jurisdiction retain the general ability to prosecute successively for
the same crime.
D. InternationalCriminal TribunalStatutes
Double jeopardy provisions also appear in the statutes of international
criminal tribunals. To take some well-known examples, the statutes
creating the ICTY and ICTR as well as the Rome Statute for the ICC all
provide for what could be viewed as double jeopardy protection at the
international level. That is, they all offer some type of shield from
successive prosecutions as between international tribunals and national

273. Id.
274. In reality, this protection is not so easily assured since the concept of territoriality has been
enlarged to include a broad range of activity including offenses exhibiting only a tangential relation to
the forum state. See Colangelo, supranote 135, at 128-29. Prosecutors often take advantage of this to
"convinc[e] courts to localise offences on the territory of their own State." Van den Wyngaert &
Stessens, supra note 13, at 784.
275. Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 1281, 1296.
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courts. 2 7 6

The double jeopardy protections contained in the statutes are
complicated and varied, but their very existence appears to generate
discord for double jeopardy rules in international law: no general double
jeopardy protection among states, but double jeopardy protection between
states and international tribunals.
This Part uses concepts of jurisdiction to resolve the discord and
untangle the double jeopardy protections in the statutes. It draws upon the
manner of creation of the tribunals and their jurisdictional provisions to
explain how states and international tribunals largely share jurisdiction
over the activity proscribed by the tribunal statutes. Thus when either a
state or a tribunal exercises jurisdiction it usually extinguishes the
jurisdiction of the other, leading to double jeopardy protection between
them. Where tribunal statutes do allow a successive prosecution, it is
because the double jeopardy provision in question has reserved a portion
of either national or international jurisdiction to the state or tribunal,
respectively, upon which that entity may prosecute.
1. ICTY and ICTR

The United Nations Security Council established the ICTY and ICTR
pursuant to its Chapter VII powers under the U.N. Charter to respond to
threats to international peace and security in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda.277 Toward this end, it delegated to the tribunals a certain amount
of subject matter, geographic and temporal jurisdiction to prosecute for
serious violations of international law. 278 While the jurisdictional

276. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827,
art. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter
ICTR Statute]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter ICC statute]; see also Agreement Between the United
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
art. 9, Jan. 16, 2002, available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/Agreement.htm [hereinafter
SC Agreement]; Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, art. 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).
277. See U.N. Charter, art. 39; ICTY Statute, supra note 276, pmbl.; ICTR Statute, supra note
276, pmbl.; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 29 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/
appeal/decision-e/51002.htm.
278. U.N. Charter, art. 39; see also ICTY Statute, supra note 276; ICTR Statute, supra note 276.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 29. The "competence" (competence being another
word for jurisdiction), of the tribunals, as set for in Article 1 of each statute, exists along three
dimensions: (1) subject matter, (2) geography, and (3) timeframe. Common Article 1 commands that
the tribunals "shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for [(1)] serious violations of
international humanitarian law [(2)] committed in [a] territory" defined by the statutes (the former
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provisions of the statutes establish concurrent jurisdiction between
national courts and international tribunals,279 the tribunals enjoy "primacy
over national courts." 280 The tribunals are accordingly the primary
enforcers of the international legal prohibitions contained in their statutes.
As part of this jurisdictional dynamic, "[a]t any stage of the procedure, the
International Tribunal
[] may formally request national courts to defer to
281
its competence."
Through its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council altered the
ordinary rules of international jurisdiction to give the tribunals primacy
over a special piece of jurisdiction, thereby creating a shared jurisdiction
between the tribunals on one hand and states on the other. By exercising
jurisdictional primacy, the tribunal overtakes the sovereignty, or national
entitlements, of all states to exercise their national jurisdictions. In the
famous Tadic case (which actually resulted from a transfer of national
proceedings to the ICTY), 28 2 Tadic directly challenged the ICTY's
jurisdiction over him on this basis. He objected specifically to this transfer
of "State sovereignty" to the tribunal,2 83 contending that the ICTY's
"primacy over domestic courts constitutes an infringement upon the
sovereignty of the State directly affected., 28 4 The ICTY Appeals Chamber
acknowledged that Article 2 of the U.N. Charter prevented the U.N. from
"interven[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State., 285 But it responded by citing "the commanding
restriction at the end of the same paragraph [of Article 2]: 'but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VIL,' ' 286 and explained that "[t]hose are precisely the
287
provisions under which the International Tribunal has been established.,
The Appeals Chamber went on to uphold the primacy of ICTY
jurisdiction over national courts quoting the Trial Chamber's conclusion
that "[o]f course, this involves some surrender of sovereignty by the

Yugoslavia and Rwanda), and (3) occurring within a time period defined by the statutes. ICTY Statute,
supra note 276, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supranote 276, art. 1. The statutes then spell out the international
crimes within their subject matter jurisdiction, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes amounting to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. ICTY Statute, supranote 276, arts. 2,
3, 4, 5; ICTR Statute, supranote 276, arts. 2, 3, 4.
279. ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 9(2); ICTR Statute, supranote 276, art. 8(2).
280. Id.

281. Id.
282. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
283.

Id.

284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. 50.
Id. 55, 56; see also U.N. Charter, art. 2.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,

50.

50, 55.

56; see also U.N. Charter, art. 2.
56.
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member nations of the United Nations, but that is precisely what was
achieved by the adoption of the Charter., 288 By granting the ICTY and
ICTR primacy of jurisdiction, the Security Council granted the tribunals
the power to transfer to themselves the sovereign entitlements, or
jurisdiction of states, to prosecute for acts falling within the tribunals'
subject matter, geographic and temporal jurisdiction. It is not by accident
that these jurisdictional provisions immediately precede, and justify, the
statutes' double jeopardy provisions.289
With respect to the latter, the statutes provide that "[n]o person shall be
tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of
international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or
she has already been tried by the International Tribunal., 290 Since the
tribunals overtake the jurisdiction of states to prosecute for the acts in
question, they leave national courts no residual jurisdiction upon which to
prosecute. Thus while national courts have concurrent jurisdiction, their
jurisdiction vanishes once the ad hoc tribunal prosecutes. And because
national courts have no jurisdiction left upon which to prosecute, double
jeopardy protection from national court prosecution obtains.
The double jeopardy shield runs the other way too in the statutes, and
protects individuals from successive tribunal prosecution where the
291
individual already has been subject to prosecution by national courts.
There are, however, two exceptions. One is practical: the national
proceedings must have been impartially, independently, and diligently
prosecuted.2 92 The other is more significant for the jurisdictional theory:
the individual "may be subsequently tried by the International Tribunal
only if the act for which he or she
was tried [in national court] was
293
characterized as an ordinarycrime."
For example, if Jane kills some people based on their ethnic identity
with the intent to destroy that ethnic group in whole or in part,294 and a
national court prosecutes Jane for the international crime of genocide, the
ad hoc tribunals may not then prosecute Jane a second time for genocide.
This provision makes sense under the jurisdictional theory presented by

288. Id. 63 (quoting the trial court).
289. See ICTY Statute, supranote 276, arts. 9, 10; ICTR Statute, supranote 276, arts. 8, 9.
290. See ICTY Statute, supranote 276, art. 10(1); ICTR Statute, supranote 276, art. 9(1).
291. See ICTY Statute, supranote 276, art. 10(2); ICTR Statute, supranote 276, art. 9(2).
292. ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 10(2)(b); ICTR Statute, supra note 276, art. 9(2)(b).
293. See ICTY Statute, supranote 276, art. 10(2)(a) (emphasis added).
294. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 6, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see also ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 4(2)(a)(2); ICTR
Statute, supranote 276, art. 2(2)(a).
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this Article. Since states are constituents of the international legal system,
the national court that prosecutes Jane for genocide would have enforced
both national and international law over the crime of genocide. The
tribunal therefore would have no jurisdiction upon which to prosecute Jane
a second time for that crime.
On the other hand, if the national court prosecutes Jane not for the
international crime of genocide, but for the "ordinary crime" of homicide,
the international tribunal may still prosecute Jane for that same act under
the international law proscribing genocide.2 95 This too would make sense
under the jurisdictional theory. Because the prior national court
proceedings did not apply and enforce international law, but prosecuted
only for "ordinary crimes" under national law, the national court did not
act as the decentralized "international sovereign." That is, the national
prosecution did not apply and enforce international law. The international
tribunal, therefore, could continue to represent a distinct lawgiver (the
international legal system) applying and enforcing a distinct law
(international law) in respect of a distinct crime (an international crime)
arising from acts for which an individual already was prosecuted in
national court.
2. ICC
While transfers of jurisdiction to the ICTY and ICTR were essentially
forced upon states through the Security Council's Chapter VII measures
creating those tribunals, transfers of jurisdiction by states to the ICC are
for the most part more voluntary in nature. States parties created the ICC
directly through international agreement, the final version of which is
embodied in its statute. 296 The ICC, in turn, draws its authority from that
agreement.29 7 The Rome Statute defines the scope and sets the terms of
states' transfers of jurisdiction to the ICC, which winds up defining the
scope and setting the terms of the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction.
Under the statute the ICC may exercise jurisdiction in three ways. First,
it may exercise jurisdiction where a state party on whose territory the

295. ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 4(2)(a)(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 276, art. 2(2)(a).
Michele N. Morosin points out that the argument for a successive international tribunal prosecution
under this type of provision "is strengthened if the country [in which the national court proceedings
occur] has a statute addressing genocide and did not charge the defendant with this crime." Morosin,
supra note 13, at 265.
296. See ICC Statute, supra note 276, pmbl. ("The States Parties to this Statute ... [h]ave agreed
as follows ... ").
297. Id. art. 1.

824

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

86:769

crime occurred or whose national is alleged to have committed the crime
refers prosecution to the ICC. 298 The referral constitutes a fairly
straightforward transfer of state party jurisdiction over territory and
nationals to the ICC. Second, the prosecutor may initiate an investigation
if the crime is alleged to have occurred in the territory of a state party or if
the person accused of the crime is a national of a state party. 299 Again, the
ICC borrows the jurisdiction of a state party over its territory and nationals
in order to prosecute. In both of these situations, ICC jurisdiction is
limited to the national jurisdictions-based
on entitlements over territory
300
and persons-of its member states.
Third, the ICC is allowed to reach beyond the national jurisdictions of
member states where crimes are "referred to the Prosecutor by the Security
30 1
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations."
Here we are back to the same transfer of jurisdiction effectuated by the
Security Council that underpinned the creation of the ICTY and ICTR.
Instead of the Security Council having to establish new ad hoc tribunals
every time international peace and security so require, the ICC stands in as
a Chapter VII organ when needed.
In contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, however, the ICC's power to
exercise jurisdiction is subject to its own special jurisdictional dynamic. It
enjoys only "complementary" jurisdiction to national courts. 30 2 Under this
dynamic, the ICC complements national courts by reinforcing "the
primary obligation of States" to prosecute for conduct constituting serious
international crimes. 30 3 Only where
states fail to fulfill this obligation does
3 04
the ICC step in to "fill the gap.
The preamble to the Rome Statute and Article 1 set forth the ICC's
complementary jurisdiction,30 5 and Article 17 lays out its central operation.
With exceptions for sham,30 6 biased,30 7 or unjustifiably delayed
298. Id. arts. 13(a), 12(2)(a),(b); cf Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdictionover the Nationals
ofNon-PartyStates: A Critique of the U.S. Position,64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 110-17 (2001).
299. ICC Statute, supranote 276, arts. 13(c), 12(2)(a),(b).
300. The "applicable law" provisions of the Rome Statute further confirm that the ICC uses states'
national jurisdiction to prosecute, explicitly directing that the ICC may rely upon "the national laws of
States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime." ICC Statute, supra note 276, art.
21(1)(c).

301. Id. art. 13(b).
302.

Id. art. 1.

303.

John T. Holmes,

The Principle of Complementarity, in INTRODUCTION TO THE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 41, 73-74 (Roy S. Lee ed.,
1999).
304. Id.

305. ICC Statute, supranote 276, pmbl., art 1.
306. Id. art. 17(2)(a).
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prosecutions in national courts,308 the ICC may not exercise jurisdiction
where a state with jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the crime, 309
has investigated the crime and decided not to prosecute, 310 or has already
tried the accused.311
Thus, like the ICTY and ICTR statutes, the Rome Statute contains a
jurisdictional dynamic between national courts and international tribunals
establishing a shared jurisdiction between them. But unlike the ICTY and
ICTR, the ICC's complementary jurisdiction places jurisdictional primacy
in the hands of states, not the tribunal. Where states exercise national
jurisdiction, they extinguish the jurisdiction of the ICC. As the flip side of
primacy of jurisdiction, the ICC's complementary jurisdiction explains the
Rome Statute's double jeopardy provisions.
Like the ad hoc tribunal statutes, the Rome Statute also protects
individuals from successive prosecutions as between the ICC and national
courts. But unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC's double jeopardy
provisions grant broader power to states, not the tribunal. In fact, just as
the ICTY and ICTR reserve a portion of international jurisdiction for the
tribunals to exercise after a national court prosecution for an ordinary
crime, the Rome Statute appears to reserve for states a portion of national
jurisdiction to exercise after an ICC prosecution for an international crime.
I shall explain in more detail.
Article 20 of the Rome Statute provides: "No person who has been
tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7, or 8
[articles which lay out conduct constituting crimes within the ICC's
subject matter jurisdiction] shall be tried by the Court with respect to the
same conduct ' 312 unless the other court's proceedings were designed to
shield the individual 313 or were otherwise flawed so as not to achieve
314
justice. Since the ICC has only complementary jurisdiction, once a state
properly exercises national jurisdiction over the conduct in question, the
ICC has no jurisdiction left upon which to prosecute. The result is double
jeopardy protection from a successive ICC prosecution for that conduct.
Reversing the double jeopardy shield to address the situation of a prior
ICC prosecution and a successive national court prosecution, Article 20

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id.art.
Id.art.
Id.art.
Id. art.
Id. art.

17(2)(c).
17(2)(b).
17(i)(a).
17(1)(b).
17(1)(c).
20(3) (emphasis added).
20(3)(a)
20(3)(b).
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provides: "No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to
in article 5 [the article setting forth crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction]
for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the
Court., 315 Notice here use of the term "crime," instead of "acts" or
"conduct." The use is deliberate on the face of the statute since, as quoted
above, Article 20 frames the double jeopardy protection flowing from
national courts to the ICC as a protection from prosecution for the "same
conduct., 316 Moreover, the Article 20 protection prohibiting a successive
prosecution in national courts for the same "crime" already adjudicated in
the ICC references Article 5 of the Rome Statute, which sets forth the
"Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court., 317 By contrast, the Article 20
protection prohibiting a successive ICC prosecution for "conduct" already
adjudicated in national courts references Articles 6, 7, and 8-articles
which lay out conduct that forms the basis of the crimes listed in Article
5.318

The scope of the double jeopardy protections in the Rome Statute is
therefore the opposite of that contained in the ICTY and ICTR statutes.
While the ICTY and ICTR have primacy over acts constituting serious
violations of international law and can extinguish national court
jurisdiction over those acts when they prosecute, national courts have
primacy over conduct constituting the crimes enumerated in the Rome
Statute and can extinguish ICC jurisdiction over that conduct when they
prosecute.
Further, just as the ICTY and ICTR might vindicate internationallaw
by prosecuting an individual for acts constituting international crimes,
even though national courts already have prosecuted the same individual
for those same acts as "ordinary" crimes under national law, the Rome
Statute leaves open the possibility that a national court might vindicate
national law by prosecuting an individual for conduct constituting an
ordinary crime, even though the ICC already has prosecuted the same
individual for that same conduct, but as an international crime. The
national court just cannot successively prosecute for the same "crime" as
the ICC, i.e., an international crime. Thus if Jane is prosecuted for the
international crime of genocide by the ICC, a national court may not

315. Id. art. 20(2).
316. Id. art. 20(3) (emphasis added). Similarly, Article 20's prohibition on successive prosecutions
in the ICC states that "no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed
the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court." Id. art. 20(1)
(emphasis added).
317. Id. arts. 20(2), 5.

318. Id. arts. 20(3), 6, 7, 8.
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prosecute her again for genocide, but may prosecute her for the ordinary
crime of homicide. And this all makes sense under the jurisdictional
theory since the national court would be enforcing a different lawnational law-than that enforced by the ICC.
This Part has shown how the complex of double jeopardy provisions
contained in international tribunal statutes becomes explicable through
concepts of jurisdiction. An exercise of jurisdiction by a tribunal usually
extinguishes an exercise of that same jurisdiction by states, and vice versa.
The result is double jeopardy protection. Where the statutes allow a
successive prosecution, they do so by reserving a portion of either national
or international jurisdiction to the state or tribunal, respectively. In sum,
the provisions make perfect sense under a jurisdictional theory of double
jeopardy.
E. UniversalJurisdiction
The analysis so far has shown international law to be largely consistent
with a jurisdictional theory of double jeopardy in that states with national
jurisdiction generally retain the power to prosecute in the face of prior
prosecutions by other states. Rules (1) and (2) of the three double jeopardy
rules set out in Part III explain this baseline rule. The analysis also has
shown how the theory helps to explain the operation of double jeopardy
rules in the special context of international tribunals where states and
tribunals share jurisdiction. What remains is to explain international law
and practice relating to exercises of universal jurisdiction under Rule (3),
which holds that a state with only universal jurisdiction cannot prosecute
again where a state with national jurisdiction already has prosecuted for
the same crime.
Since states have begun only recently to explore in earnest universal
jurisdiction over activity occurring in the territories of other states, 319 it is
probably premature to conclude that state practice and opinio juris (that
the practice results from a sense of legal obligation) 320 already have
combined definitively to establish that a prosecution by a state with
national jurisdiction bars prosecutions by states with only universal
jurisdiction. Yet the clear international trend appears overwhelmingly to
favor this double jeopardy rule. The jurisdictional theory indicates why.

319.
320.

(2002).

See REYDAMS, supranote 154, at 1.
See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NoRMs, ACTORS, PROCESSES 75
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To take one high-profile example, Spain's universal jurisdiction law
contains an express double jeopardy bar to this effect. Codified at Article
23.4 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it limits the exercise of
universal jurisdiction to situations where "the accused has not been
absolved, pardoned, or sentenced in another country, or in the last case,
that the sentence has not been completed., 321 Spanish courts have
elaborated the jurisdictional rationale of this double jeopardy limitation.
The Spanish Supreme Court observed in the Peruvian Genocide case
involving universal jurisdiction claims over former Peruvian Prime
Minister Alberto Fujimori that "the necessity of judicial intervention
pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction remains excluded when
[the] territorial jurisdiction is effectively prosecuting the crime of
universal character in its own country." 322 In keeping with this Article's
theory, the Court explained that this principle of jurisdictional exclusion
"is derived from the very nature ... of universal jurisdiction., 323 Because
Peru, the national jurisdiction state, had initiated its own prosecution
against the accused, Spanish jurisdiction was "excluded" and the case
dismissed.324 More recently, in the Guatemala Genocide Case, the
Constitutional Court called upon Article 23.4's double jeopardy limitation
to respond to concerns about competition among jurisdictions resulting
from universal jurisdiction.325 The Court explained that since a prosecution
by a state with national jurisdiction
precludes universal jurisdiction by
326
Spain, no competition would result.
What is perhaps even more interesting is that Spain seems to have a
relatively permissive law as compared to other countries with universal
jurisdiction laws on the books. While explicitly referencing Article 23.4's
double jeopardy bar as a limitation on the exercise of universal jurisdiction
in the Guatemala Genocide case, the Constitutional Court refused to apply
a principle of subsidiary jurisdiction.32 7 Under the particular subsidiary
principle at issue in the case, the party bringing the universal jurisdiction

321. Peruvian Genocide, STS, May 20, 2003 (J.T.S. No. 712), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 1200, 1205
(2003). Also, states with laws generally prohibiting successive prosecutions for extraterritorial acts
where the accused already has been prosecuted abroad necessarily include a prohibition on successive
universal jurisdiction prosecutions. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 65(4) (Austria),
translatedin REYDAMS, supra note 154, at 94; see also Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13,
at 784.
322. Peruvian Genocide, 42 I.L.M. 1200, 1205.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1206.
325. Guatemala Genocide, supranote 146.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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action would have needed affirmatively to show inaction on the part of the
state with national jurisdiction in order for Spanish courts to exercise
jurisdiction.3 28 The Court felt that this was too high a burden to place on
plaintiffs.32 9 Its discussion raises the far more common reason why any
instances of successful successive prosecution based solely on universal
jurisdiction are so hard to find.330
The major reason why states appear not to prosecute successively on
universal jurisdiction grounds is that these cases never appear to be
brought in the first place, or never seem to reach any meaningful stage of
procedure. States do not confront the double jeopardy issue in cases of
universal jurisdiction because they tend broadly to defer to states with
national jurisdiction, and only take up universal jurisdiction prosecutions
where it can be shown-and the burden is usually on the parties trying to
initiate suit to show it-that states with national jurisdiction are either
unable or unwilling to prosecute, or that the prior prosecution was a sham
designed to shield the accused. Thus a main situation in which states have
been willing to exercise universal jurisdiction in the past has been where
the national
jurisdiction state simply does not have a functioning legal
33 1
system.
In this sense universal jurisdiction appears to function as a kind of
subsidiary or complementary jurisdiction to national jurisdiction, whereby
states with national jurisdiction have "first dibs" and can, through a good
faith prosecutorial effort, foreclose the possibility of a successive universal
jurisdiction prosecution in a manner similar to a national court foreclosing
a successive international tribunal prosecution.332 To be sure, some states'
universal jurisdiction laws specifically provide for only complementary
jurisdiction precisely because the laws implement obligations under the
ICC's Rome Statute.333 Thus, as in the tribunal statutes, the double
jeopardy question becomes consequentially linked to the question of
jurisdictional priority. States do not exercise universal jurisdiction because

328. Id.; see also Naomi Roht-Arraiza, InternationalDecision: Guatemala Genocide Case, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 207, 210 (2006).

329. Guatemala Genocide, supranote 146.
330. Research has uncovered no instance of a successive prosecution based only on universal
jurisdiction.
331.

See Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Universal Jurisdiction: In Absentia Signaling over

ClearlyDefined Crimes, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 537, 551-57 (2005) (discussing cases).
332.

See supraPart I.E.

333. See, e.g., Vilkerstrafgesetzbuch [VStGB] [German Code of Crimes Against Int'l Law] June
30, 2002, BGB1. I at 2254 (F.R.G.). An English translation is available at the homepage for the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/shared/data/
pdf/vstgbengl.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
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they give primacy to states with national jurisdiction, and the result is a
shield from successive universal jurisdiction prosecution. The Republic of
the Congo recently argued in a case pending before the International Court
of Justice that this principle of subsidiary jurisdiction already has attained
international legal force, and therefore foreclosed French universal
jurisdiction proceedings against Congolese nationals because a Congolese
prosecution for the same offenses against the same individuals already had
commenced.334 After canvassing state practice in this regard, I explain that
this rule of priority finds further support in international treaty law.
1. JurisdictionalPriorityin NationalLaws
The determination by states with universal jurisdiction laws to give
primacy to states with national jurisdiction occurs through a number of
devices, including the law itself, judicial construction of the law, and
prosecutorial discretion (which is often purposely incorporated into the
universal jurisdiction law to guarantee such primacy).
a. Legislative andJudicialDeterminations
Some states have built into their laws a jurisdictional hierarchy that
grants primacy to states with national jurisdiction. For instance, the
Austrian Supreme Court has interpreted Austrian Penal Code § 65(1)(2),
which allows extraterritorial jurisdiction only if the accused cannot be
extradited, 335 to condition Austrian exercises of universal jurisdiction on
an inability to extradite to the state with territorial jurisdiction because that
state's legal system is not functional.33 6 Similarly, Dutch law recognizes a
hierarchy of jurisdiction which gives priority to states with territorial
337
jurisdiction over the exercise of universal jurisdiction by Dutch courts.
In deciding whether to exercise

universal jurisdiction, Austrian,338

334. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. 107 (June 16);
Application Instituting Proceedings, On Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003
I.C.J. Pleadings IV(A)(1),

2 (Apr. 11, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/129/

7067.pdf. The Court has not yet issued an opinion. Like Spain, France's universal jurisdiction law
prohibits universal jurisdiction proceedings against individuals who have been finally acquitted or
convicted abroad. See French Code de procedure p6nale [C. PR. PEN.], art. 692 (Fr.).
335. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] §§ 64(1)(6), 65(1)(2) (Austria).
336.

ARIANA PEARLROTH, REDRESS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:

COUNTRY STUDIES 3 (2003), http://www.redress.org/conferences/country%/ 20studies.pdf (summarizing
the Cvjetkovic Case).
337. Id. at 26.
338. REYDAMS, supranote 154, at 99.
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Danish, 339 German, 341 and Belgian 341 courts all appear to have first
determined that states with national jurisdiction were either unwilling or
unable to prosecute. As the Bavarian Supreme Court explained its exercise
of universal jurisdiction over a Bosnian national for crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia, "since the ... competent territorial State do[es] not

wish to take over the proceedings, Germany has an interest not to be
perceived by the international community as a haven for international
criminals. 3 42
b. ProsecutorialDiscretion
More recently, prosecutorial discretion has become a popular device to
block universal jurisdiction exercises through jurisdictional primacy
determinations before a case even gets to the courts. This discretion is
often incorporated directly into the universal jurisdiction law, and is often
an exceptional power unique to universal jurisdiction complaints. One of
the major overhauls of the much-ballyhooed Belgian universal jurisdiction
legislation was the addition of absolute prosecutorial discretion over
universal jurisdiction claims.343 Previously, as is typical in civil law
countries, private victims could initiate suit through constitution de partie
civile before an investigating judge. 344 The Belgian law was amended
twice in 2003 to give the public prosecutor the sole and unreviewable
discretion to move forward with a universal jurisdiction case,34 5 and to
refuse to proceed if "this matter should be brought.., before a tribunal in
the place where the acts were committed, or before the tribunals of a State
in which the offender is a national or where he may be found, and as long
as this tribunal is competent, independent, impartial and fair." 346 It was
precisely this type of prosecutorial discretion provision-again,
incorporated right into the universal jurisdiction law itself-that prevented
a recent case against former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

339. Id. at 127-29.
340. Id. at 151-52.
341. Id. at 109-11, 114.
342. Id. at 151.
343. Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888, 890
(2003).
344. Christine Van den Wyngaert, Belgium, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 16-18 (Christine Van den Wyngaert et al. eds., 1993).

345. US. Reaction to Belgian UniversalJurisdictionLaw, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 984, 986-87 (2003).
346. Loi modifiant la loi du 16 juin 1993 relative A la repression des violations graves du droit
international humanitaire et l'article 144 ter du Code judiciaire, Apr. 23, 2003, M.B., May 7, 2003,
translatedin 42 I.L.M. 749 (2003); see also Ratner, supranote 343, at 891 n. 12.
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and others from going forward in German courts.347 The prosecutor

explained the power to prosecute universal crimes was subject to "a
certain hierarchy," under which German universal jurisdiction was not
available unless it could be shown that "the primarily competent
jurisdictions," namely, "the state of the scene of the crime and the state
whose nationals the 348
perpetrators and victims are" were either unwilling or
unable to prosecute.
2. JurisdictionalPriorityin Treaty Law
The primary competence of national jurisdiction states over states with
only universal jurisdiction finds further support in treaty law. Close
examination of the jurisdictional provisions of a wide range of treaties

covering international crimes reveals, or at least strongly indicates, a
jurisdictional hierarchy according to which states with national jurisdiction

have priority over states with only universal jurisdiction. Two sets of
jurisdictional provisions tend toward this conclusion.
The first set is made up of provisions setting forth states parties with

jurisdiction over the crime that is the subject of the treaty. These
provisions routinely contain a series of paragraphs directing states to
establish jurisdiction.349 States with what we have been calling national
jurisdiction-that is, states having some connection to the crime based on
territoriality, nationality, or national defense-are grouped together in
paragraphs above separate, lower paragraphs that contemplate jurisdiction
by states with no such link.350

347. See Scott Lyons, German Criminal Complaint Against Donald Rumsfeld and Others, AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHT, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights/2OO6/12/insightsO61214.html.
348. Letter and Memorandum from the Gen. Prosecuting Attorney of the Fed. Court to Wolfgang
Kaleck (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.brusselstribunal.org/pdf/RumsfeldGermany.pdf.
349. See infra note 350.
350. See Torture Convention, supra note 157, art. 5(1); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, art. 4(1), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter
Hijacking Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, art. 5(1), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention]; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 5(1), Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S 205; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, art. 6(1),(2), Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Maritime
Navigation Convention]; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art.
6(1),(2), Dec. 15, 1997, S. TREATY DOC No. 106-6, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter Bombing
Convention]; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 7(1),
(2), Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter Financing Convention]; International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, art. 9(1),(2), annexed to G.A. Res. 59/240, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/59/240 (Feb. 24, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 815 (2005) [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism Convention];
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, art. 12(1),(2), G.A. Res. 58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003), 43
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These lower paragraphs, which are becoming increasingly common in
treaties covering international crimes, 351 provide for the establishment of
"jurisdiction over the[] crimes in cases where the alleged offender is
present in [the state's] territory and it does not extradite him... to any of
the states [with national jurisdiction] .'352 The lower paragraph, in short,
provides for a treaty-based equivalent of universal jurisdiction among
states parties based on the presence of the accused 353 and for the exercise
of this type of jurisdiction where the accused is not extradited to a state
with national jurisdiction.
Article 5 of the Torture Convention is emblematic. Paragraph 1 lists the
states with national jurisdiction and paragraph 2 provides for the treatybased equivalent of universal jurisdiction among states parties based on
the presence of the accused, which jurisdiction is to be exercised where the
accused is not extradited to a state with national jurisdiction:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4
in the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its
jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State
considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases
where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its

I.L.M. 37 (2004) [hereinafter Corruption Convention]; International Convention Against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, art 9(1), G.A. Res. 44/34, art. 10, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989) [hereinafter Mercenary Convention]; International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, art 9(1), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.22/
WP. 1I/REV.4 (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Enforced Disappearance Convention].
351. Older treaties covering international crimes do not provide for jurisdiction by states with no
territorial or national link to the crime. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, supranote 294, art. 6.
352. See Torture Convention, supra note 157, art. 5(2); Hijacking Convention, supra note 350, art.
4(2); Montreal Convention, supranote 350, art. 5(2); Hostage Convention, supra note 350, art. 5(2);
Maritime Navigation Convention, supranote 350, art. 6(4); Bombing Convention, supranote 350, art.
6(4); Financing Convention, supra note 350, art. 7(4); Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 350,
art. 9(4); Corruption Convention, supra note 350, art. 3(5); Mercenary Convention, supra note 350,
art. 9(2); Enforced Disappearance Convention, supranote 350, art. 9(2).
353. For elaboration of this point, see Colangelo, supra note 135, at 166-69.
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jurisdiction and it does not extradite him ...to any of the States
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.354
The paragraph 2 catch-all thus seems designed to supplement the
national jurisdiction in the first paragraph by closing a jurisdictional
loophole among states parties, ensuring that the accused has no safe haven
within their combined territories. The simple placement of this treatybased equivalent of universal jurisdiction into separate, "secondary"
paragraphs-ones that come after the list of states with "primary" national

jurisdiction-is significant,3 55 and the absolute uniformity of this hierarchy
across treaties covering international crimes suggests that states consider
jurisdiction without territorial or national links to the crime to be a
subordinate basis of jurisdiction to jurisdiction based on such links, which

ordinarily takes priority.
The second set of treaty provisions indicating that national jurisdiction

states have priority over universal jurisdiction states are the prior notice
provisions. These provisions require a state party with custody over the
accused to "immediately notify" the states with national jurisdiction, and,
if the circumstances warrant a preliminary inquiry into the case, to
"promptly report its findings to the said [national jurisdiction] States and
[to] indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction."' 356 The provisions
consequently signal which states have strong jurisdictional interests, i.e.,
states with national jurisdiction, and offer the opportunity to those states to
request extradition before another, universal jurisdiction state exercises
jurisdiction. It should be noted also that dicta in a Joint Separate Opinion

from a recent case in the International Court of Justice involving a claim
of universal jurisdiction further supports the view that states with national
357
jurisdiction take priority over states with only universal jurisdiction.

354. Torture Convention, supranote 157, art. 5.
355. There are a few treaties that contain more than one paragraph listing states with national
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Corruption Convention, supra note 350, art. 42. What is important for my
argument is that the treaty-based equivalent of universal jurisdiction comes after these national
jurisdiction provisions, and that it is included in a separate paragraph. See id. This is uniformly true in
the treaties. See supra note 350.
356. Torture Convention, supranote 157, art. 6(4).
357. Concerning the Arrest Warrant ofll April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Cong. v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121,
59 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal). Among other
guidelines, the Judges prescribed that the state wishing to assert universal jurisdiction "must first offer
to the national State of the prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the charges
concerned." Id. Given my reliance on treaty law, I want to draw some attention to where I think the
opinion errs.
The opinion distinguishes between "a classical assertion of []universal jurisdiction"
exercised where the accused is not present on the state's territory, id. 21, and the types of treaty
provisions I have referred to above which, according to the opinion, have "come to be referred to as
'universal jurisdiction,' though this is really an obligatory territorial jurisdiction over persons albeit in
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In all, state practice accompanied by what appears to be an emerging
sense of opinio juris indicates that states consider a good faith

prosecutorial effort by a national jurisdiction state to foreclose the
possibility

of a

successive

prosecution

by

states with

universal

jurisdiction. Again, the jurisdictional theory explains why. Moreover,
there appears a strong trend among states with universal jurisdiction laws
to give primacy to states with national jurisdiction. In this respect,
universal jurisdiction operates as a subsidiary or complementary
jurisdiction to national jurisdiction. The trend of prioritizing national
jurisdiction over universal jurisdiction is further supported by
jurisdictional provisions contained in multilateral treaties, was recently
argued in a case pending before the ICJ, and was approved by dicta in a
recent ICJ opinion. Such a trend is highly significant to international
double jeopardy protections because if the state with national jurisdiction

prosecutes first for the crime at issue, the state with universal jurisdiction
cannot successively prosecute-at least under a jurisdictional theory of
double jeopardy.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

So far I have argued that a jurisdictional theory of double jeopardy
supplies a useful analytical vehicle for understanding the corpus of
Supreme Court dual sovereignty jurisprudence and also brings coherence
to what otherwise looks like an unintelligible grab bag of international
rules and practice. In this respect, my arguments until now have been
largely descriptive. While the theory's explanatory force may be able to
stand on its own as a helpful contribution, it also recommends important

relation to acts committed elsewhere," id. 41. The opinion's distinction between "classical" and
"treaty-based" universal jurisdiction may well hold for universal adjudicative, or in personam,
jurisdiction: the presence of the accused within a state's territory gives that state's courts personal
jurisdiction, under the treaty, irrespective of where the crime occurred. Yet the distinction becomes
more difficult to sustain with respect to prescriptive jurisdiction, or the state's initial power to apply its
laws to the conduct in question. The crime did not occur on the state's territory and thus, as the opinion
concedes, it is not that the state is exercising territorial jurisdiction over the crime itself. Rather, the
opinion seems to be suggesting that once the defendant is in the state's territory, the state has
jurisdiction to prescribe as to that defendant. But if the presence of the accused-at some later pointis all that is giving the state prescriptive power, the exercise of that power inevitably raises serious ex
post facto problems if the state did not already have that power to begin with at the time the crime was
committed (when the state had no link to the defendant). It would betray bedrock criminal law notions
of legality to say, for instance, "We had no power to apply our law prohibiting X to you at the time you
committed X, but now that you're in our territory we are empowered retroactively to apply our
prohibition to you." Only if X were already prohibited under a universal international legal
prohibition-that the state subsequently enforces once it obtains personal jurisdiction over the
defendant-can the prescriptive jurisdiction stand.
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doctrinal developments for double jeopardy law and practice in both the
U.S. and international systems.
In this Part I explore some of the more significant implications of the
theory in this regard. To frame the discussion I begin by flagging an
inherent normative tension between state sovereignty and individual rights
in double jeopardy rules among sovereigns. In light of this tension, I argue
that a jurisdictional theory can enrich both U.S. constitutional and
international legal evaluation of double jeopardy by importing more
nuanced analysis into conventional doctrine to better accommodate the
competing interests at stake-particularly, individual rights interests; and
therefore, the theory promises a sounder doctrine of double jeopardy in
both systems. Specifically, the theory can enrich U.S. doctrine by calling
for a due process analysis of a successively prosecuting sovereign's
jurisdiction-an analysis that holds the potential to change outcomes in
cases of either U.S. state or federal extraterritorial jurisdiction. The theory
similarly can enrich international doctrine through a reasonableness
analysis of a successively prosecuting sovereign's jurisdiction-an
analysis that reflects the doctrinal and normative correctness of the double
jeopardy rules articulated in Part III.
Lastly, I engage the situation where multiple sovereigns legitimately
have jurisdiction to pursue multiple prosecutions even under the revised
constitutional and international tests proposed below. I suggest that this
does not mean that these sovereigns necessarily will exercise that power to
vindicate their interests. In fact, comity mechanisms already built into both
the U.S. and international systems aim to facilitate a single prosecution in
a single forum so as to satisfy the interests of multiple sovereigns, thus
increasing efficiency and reducing friction for the system while
simultaneously advancing the individual's interest not to be prosecuted
multiple times for the same crime.
A. Normative Stakes
The central normative tension in double jeopardy rules among
sovereigns is between the ability of sovereigns to protect their interests
through the enforcement of their criminal laws and the rights of
individuals to be free from multiple prosecutions for the same criminal
activity. The former ability self-evidently motivates the U.S. dual
sovereignty doctrine as well as current international rules allowing states
with independent jurisdiction successively to prosecute for acts that harm
important entitlements over national territory and persons.
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The "underlying idea" of double jeopardy protection from the
individual rights perspective, on the other hand,
is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even
358
though innocent he may be found guilty.
Taking this language at face value one might observe that the dual
sovereignty doctrine and corresponding rules of international law appear
to avoid the injunction against successive prosecutions since it is not the
same "State" repeatedly attempting to convict. Justice Black's reply to this
observation in his dissent in Bartkus (a decision upholding on dual
sovereignty grounds multiple prosecutions for the same robbery by federal
and state authorities) goes far toward erasing that comfort:
Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who is being
prosecuted, this [dual sovereignty] notion is too subtle for me to
grasp. ... [I]t hurts no less for two "Sovereigns" to inflict [double
jeopardy] than for one. ... In each case, inescapably,
a man is
359
forced to face danger twice for the same conduct.
36 °
The same reasoning would seem to apply in the international context.
From the defendant's perspective it does not matter all that much whether
he is prosecuted twice by Germany, or whether he is prosecuted first by
Italy and then by Germany. 361 In both cases the same individual
is
362
"inescapably... forced to face danger twice for the same conduct.,

The salient normative question for double jeopardy rules among
sovereigns therefore is how best to accommodate the sovereign's right to
enforce its laws and the individual's right not to be prosecuted multiple
times for the same criminal act. Conventional doctrine appears to offer a
rather blunt binary choice: either we ought to allow multiple sovereigns to
enforce their laws leading possibly to as many prosecutions as sovereigns
with jurisdiction, or we ought to prohibit sovereigns from prosecuting
successively in order absolutely to safeguard defendants' rights.

358. Greene v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
359. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
360. Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supranote 13, at 781.
361. Id.
362. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155.
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This choice certainly dominates prevailing double jeopardy doctrine as
far as the U.S. Supreme Court is concerned (and we know which way the
Court comes out). 363 The Court openly views dual sovereignty as an
either/or proposition: either the successively prosecuting entity is a
separate sovereign, in which case the prosecution is permissible, or it is
not, in which case the prosecution is barred under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Indeed, noting that a "balancing of interests approach ... cannot
be reconciled with the dual sovereignty principle," the Court has flatly
observed: "If the States are separate sovereigns, as they must be under the
definition of sovereignty which the Court has consistently employed, the
circumstances of the case are irrelevant., 364 The lines are perhaps less
clearly drawn for the international system. The law in some areas appears
to make this type of broad distinction: either the human right against
double jeopardy attaches to multiple prosecutions by multiple states, or it
doesn't. Yet practice seems more hued with some states undertaking a
species of interest analysis to determine whether successively to prosecute,
especially in cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 365 1 will now show how
the theory enriches both U.S. and international doctrine.
B. Implicationsfor U.S. ConstitutionalDoctrine: "Due Process"
As Part II of this Article demonstrated, the "sovereign" ability under
the U.S. dual sovereignty doctrine successively to prosecute originates in
the ability independently to make and apply law to the defendant, or to
exercise jurisdiction. Nearly one hundred years ago the Supreme Court
emphasized that although dual sovereignty was "thoroughly established,"
it "relate[s] only to cases where the act sought to be punished is one over
which both sovereignties have jurisdiction." 366 But if that is right, and the
genesis and history of the doctrine strongly indicate that it is, the Court's
current dual sovereignty jurisprudence routinely ignores a critical
constitutional inquiry: whether the successively prosecuting sovereign's
exercise ofjurisdiction satisfies due process.
All U.S. law students will recognize that a state's exercise of
jurisdiction cannot be "arbitrary or fundamentally unfair" under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 367 and that neither can the

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 91-94 (1985).
Id. at 92.
See supraParts IV.C.1.b, I.E.
S. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n oflnd., 236 U.S. 439, 445 (1915).
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 311 (1981).
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federal government's under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 368 U.S. law students also know that-in stark contrast to the
Supreme Court's present dual sovereignty analysis-such a due process
evaluation is a highly nuanced, fact-sensitive inquiry. A state's exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction must satisfy constitutional tests that consider,
among other things, the degree of contacts between the forum, the parties
and the occurrence, 369 the interests of the forum, 370 and the reasonable
371
expectations of the parties,
in order both to protect defendants and to
ensure that states "do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by
their status as coequal sovereigns." 372 Also relevant to the calculus are the
efficient resolution of controversies, orderly administration of law, and
shared substantive policies within a system of multiple sovereigns.3 73
The Supreme Court's present dual sovereignty analysis contains none
of this. A due process inquiry into the successively prosecuting state's
jurisdiction therefore not only seems required for dual sovereignty
purposes given the jurisprudential origins and history of that doctrine, but
also healthily complicates what is, at present, an unreflective doctrine that
utterly excludes one of the two main normative considerations implicated
by double jeopardy rules among sovereigns: individual rights. Moreover,
as a pure matter of constitutional interpretation, the move to incorporate
due process into double jeopardy doctrine has a certain structural appeal;
the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Due Process Clause protections
against federal power appear in the same amendment, 374 and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy protection against the states.375
Significantly, a due process inquiry into a successively prosecuting
sovereign's jurisdiction likely would not alter dual sovereignty outcomes
for successive prosecutions between federal and state governments-the
original justification for the doctrine. Rather its bite would be on

368.
369.
(1985).

See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990).
See Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 & n.24; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shuts, 472 U.S. 797, 822

370.

Id.

371.

Id.

372. Hague, 449 U.S. at 334 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1980)).
373. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294; Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 113-15 (1987). I realize that citing these cases adds to the prescriptive jurisdiction analysis
adjudicative and, particularly, personal jurisdiction considerations. However, as Justice Black has
pointed out, "both inquiries are closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar
considerations." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 224-25 (1977).
374. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
375. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
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successive prosecutions between U.S. states or by the U.S. federal
government when it exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction. I address each
scenario in turn.
1. Federal/State
Certain features of U.S. federalism indicate that a due process analysis
likely would not alter the dual sovereignty doctrine's preservation of
separate federal and state prosecutorial power. Federal and state
governments have overlapping territorial jurisdiction with respect to
certain criminal acts and the defendant who commits them. Thus the
defendant has clear notice, and simultaneously enjoys the benefits and
protections, of both sets of laws. It is also likely that the laws aim to
achieve different substantive policies, making their enforcement nonredundant.
Recall the very first articulation of the dual sovereignty doctrine:
"Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State.... He may
be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and [sic] may be liable to
punishment for an infraction of the laws of either., 376 The Court also
expounded early on that every citizen "owes allegiance to the two
departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the
penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. 377
In return, he can
demand protection from each within its own jurisdiction.,
It would not be unfair, under this original reasoning, to apply two sets
of laws to the individual defendant because he both benefits from their
concurrent protections and knows-he has notice and a reasonable
expectation-that he is subject to two sets of laws and in fact may be held
to account for breaking each of them. Moreover, each sovereign has a
distinct interest-one federal and the other local-in enforcing its own
distinct law, each of which tends to confer its own distinct benefits. This
early reasoning is at the heart of a due process gauge that evaluates a
sovereign's exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to the benefits conferred by
that sovereign's laws upon the defendant, notice, and the efficient
administration of law. 378 It thus squarely addresses both of the normative
considerations mentioned above.

376.
377.
378.

Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852).
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875).
See supranotes 368-73.
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2. State/State
The situation is different in the inter-state context where jurisdiction
arguably is exercised extraterritorially and the interests of the states in
enforcing local law are substantially similar. Take the case of Heath v.
Alabama.379 Heath had hired two men in Georgia to kidnap and kill his
wife, which they did-in Georgia. 38 He was prosecuted for homicide in
Georgia and pleaded guilty in exchange for a life sentence to avoid the
death penalty. 381 Alabama then prosecuted him for the same homicide,
convicting him and sentencing him to death.382
Heath argued to the Supreme Court that virtually all of the activity
relating to the crime took place in Georgia.383 Thus, he contended, "the
facts of this case strongly suggest that Alabama overreached its
constitutional authority in exercising jurisdiction over these events that
occurred in another state., 384 This was especially so, Heath argued, since
unlike a successive federal/state prosecution scenario, Alabama and
Georgia had the same interest in prosecution-the enforcement of local
law against homicide. 385 The Court refused to consider his jurisdictional
objections, however, because Heath had failed to raise them on appeal in
Alabama state court.386 And, finding Georgia and Alabama to be separate
"sovereigns" with a perfunctory nod to the "ultimate source of power" of
each, the Court upheld the successive prosecution.387
But under a jurisdictional theory the Court would have had to consider
Heath's objections to Alabama jurisdiction over him-for it was that very
jurisdiction,the ability to apply Alabama law to him, that made Alabama a
"sovereign" with the meaning of the dual sovereignty doctrine. Who
knows how the Court ultimately would have come out on the issue (there
was evidence that at least some steps leading up to the homicide occurred
in Alabama); 388 but a due process analysis would have supplied a richer,
more rights-sensitive approach by evaluating, inter alia, whether Heath
reasonably could have known he was subjecting himself to Alabama law,

379.

474 U.S. 82, 82 (1985).

380.

Id.

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Id. at 84.
Id.
Brief of Petitioner at 27, Heath, 474 U.S. 82 (No. 84-5555).
Id.
Id. at 48.
Heath, 474 U.S. at 87.
Id. at 87-90.
Brief of Petitioner at 27, Heath, 474 U.S. 82 (No. 84-5555).
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and whether he had availed himself of that law389 and might be forced to
defend himself in Alabama,3 90 the strength of Alabama's interest in a
successive prosecution given the prior Georgia conviction under a nearly
identical law, 391 and Alabama's prosecution in relation to the efficient
administration of the law in a federal system. 392 Such a nuanced inquiry
capable of bringing into the fold of its analysis both the sovereign's and
the individual's interests would be far preferable to the current onedimensional approach employed by the Court-an approach that, again,
completely excludes individual rights.
A due process approach also reinforces what the Supreme Court
already has suggested about the extraterritorial application of state
criminal law. U.S. states have for the most part adopted statutes, based on
the Model Penal Code,3 9 3 that enlarge their territorial jurisdiction to
encompass conduct within the state that leads to 3 94 or is intended to lead
to 395 a harmful result outside the state, as well as to conduct outside the
state that leads to 39 6 or is intended to lead to 39 7 a harmful result inside the
state.39 8 While the Court has stated that "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction,
but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify
a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the defendant] had been
present at the effect,, 399 it has also found troubling under the Fourteenth
Amendment a state's criminalization of a status inside its borders without
an act in its borders. 400 Rather than engaging in fictions about territoriality,
a due process inquiry into a state's jurisdiction supplies established
analytical machinery for determining whether a given trans-border crime
meets the constitutional threshold for the application of a state's criminal
law. Firing a gun from State A across the border into State B and killing
someone there may present a fairly clear case of State B criminal

389.

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).

390. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1980).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 16.4(c) (3d ed. 2007).
394. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(a) (1985).
395. Id. § 1.03(1)(b), (c).
396. Id. § 1.03(l)(a).
397. Id. § 1.03(1)(b), (c).
398. The constitutionality of this legislation has been held not to violate due process "[b]ecause
such legislation adheres to the territorial principle." LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 393, § 16.4(c).
399. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
400. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) ("We hold that a state law which imprisons
a person thus afflicted [by drug addiction] as a criminal, even though he has never touched any
narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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jurisdiction. 4 ° 1 But what about poisoning a person in State A, who then
travels to State B and dies there-or perhaps boards a plane to State Q,
three thousand miles away. Should the latter States have jurisdiction to
prosecute? What if the defendant had reason to know the victim would
travel to State Q? What if the defendant did not have reason to know the
victim would travel to State Q? Would it make a difference if State A, the
State with clearly stronger links to the act, prosecutes first? The advent of
the internet and cybercrime only adds to the complexity and urgency of
these questions. A due process analysis that measures the connection
between the criminal activity and the forum, as well as the interests of the
forum, the defendant, and the larger system of co-equal states provides a
ready and sophisticated framework for answering such complex
jurisdictional and, under the theory presented here, double jeopardy
questions for the domestic inter-state system. And it does so in a way that
explicitly considers individual rights.
3. FederalExtraterritorial
Just as a state may not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction contrary to
Fourteenth Amendment due process, the federal government may not
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction contrary to Fifth Amendment due
process. While the courts of appeals appear to use slightly varying tests to
determine whether an extension of federal jurisdiction abroad violates due
process, all courts to have considered the matter have found that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the exercise of such jurisdiction from being
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.40 2 Elsewhere I have argued that the
proper test-and the test that most courts employ even if they may not
always come out and say so-incorporates jurisdictional principles of
international law.40 3 By incorporating international law, Fifth Amendment
due process affords the federal government a more expansive
jurisdictional reach in the international context than the Fourteenth
Amendment affords the states in the domestic context. For instance, while
a state must have some link to the activity it seeks to regulate under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 40 4 the Fifth Amendment's incorporation of the

401.
402.
403.
404.

See Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285.
Colangelo, supra note 135, at 158-88 (discussing cases).
Id.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).
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international law of universal jurisdiction allows the federal government to
apply its laws to conduct having no nexus to the United States.40 5
Finally, although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed directly the
issue of Fifth Amendment due process limits on federal extraterritoriality,
it has said in the related context of extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction
by states over foreign defendants that due process not only considers the
defendant's interests, but also "calls for [consideration of] the procedural
and substantive polices of other nations whose interests are affected by the
assertion of jurisdiction," requiring "a careful inquiry into the
reasonableness of jurisdiction in the particular case" 40 6 -a move that leads
right into the international rule described next.
C. Implicationsfor InternationalLegal Doctrine: "Reasonableness"
Like its importation of due process analysis into U.S. double jeopardy
jurisprudence, the jurisdictional theory enriches international doctrine by
inviting a reasonableness analysis of a successively prosecuting nationstate's jurisdiction. The oft-quoted test set forth by the Restatement on
Foreign Relations Law provides that "a state may not exercise jurisdiction
to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections
with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable. 40 7 Chief among the factors for determining reasonableness
are: "the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has40a8
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;"
"connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person ... responsible for the activity to be
regulated [the defendant], or between that state and those whom the
[regulated activity] is designed to protect [the plaintiff/victim] ;,,409 the
41 °
"importance of regulat[ing]" that particular activity to regulating state;
the "justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the

405. Colangelo, supra note 135, at 170-76.
406. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
407. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1)
(1987); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818-19 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
408.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 403(2)(a).
409. Id. § 403(2)(b).
410. Id. § 403(2)(c).
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regulation;, 411 the interests of, and "likelihood of
conflict" with, other
413
states; 412 and traditions of the international system.
These factors look very much like factors U.S. courts use to evaluate
jurisdiction under a due process inquiry; and in fact we have seen that the
Supreme Court "typically describe[s] [due process] in terms of
'reasonableness.' 4 14 The factors similarly move past a simplistic
sovereignty/individual rights choice to a more contextual, nuanced
evaluation of a successively prosecuting state's jurisdiction. Here I show
how a reasonableness analysis provides a realistic and desirable way for
international law to evaluate double jeopardy rules among sovereigns in
light of the framework articulated and substantiated in Parts III and IV.
1. GeneralApplication
Parts III and IV demonstrated that international law presently allows
different sovereigns successively to prosecute for the same crime if they
have independent bases of national jurisdiction over that crime. 415 A
competing normative view might hold that double jeopardy protection
ought to apply across all states to guarantee the defendant's individual
right against successive prosecutions. Strict adherence to either one of
these views tends to preclude the other. Jurisdictional analysis provides a
middle route: consideration of not only whether a state has a basis of
national jurisdiction to prosecute successively, but also whether the
exercise of that jurisdiction is reasonable given the factors above, reveals
more balanced and realistically acceptable rules of international double
jeopardy.
To address the strict individual rights view first, any hard-and-fast rule
prohibiting double jeopardy among national jurisdictionally interested
states is, at present, highly improbable. States have strong sovereign
interests in retaining the power to prosecute individuals who inflict serious
harm on national territory and persons and whose actions threaten the
security of the state itself It is highly unlikely that states would be willing
absolutely to surrender that power just because another state already has
prosecuted. And frankly, nor is it clear that they should. If Osama bin
Laden is caught traveling through Europe and is prosecuted by Spanish

411. Id. § 403(2)(d).
412. Id. § 403(2)(h).

413. Id. § 403(2)(e).
414. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
415. See id.
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courts for the September 11, 2001, bombings in New York City, should
the United States really then have no power to prosecute him? Even if he
is prosecuted in Afghanistan, a state with territorial links to the crimes, it
is far from obvious that the United States ought thereafter to be blocked
from exercising its own sovereign power to enforce its own criminal laws
for acts that murdered approximately three thousand U.S. citizens on U.S.
soil. Nor does it seem appropriate for a Spanish or German or Dutch
prosecution of a serious human rights violator like Augusto Pinochet to
foreclose a prosecution for torture in Chile, the locus of both the crime and
the victim community. Yet a strict rule against international double
jeopardy would seem to compel such results.
The better, and far more realistic, approach would be to use a
reasonableness analysis that considers-like due process-the defendant's
connections with the forum and reasonable expectations, the forum's
interest in prosecution, and the impact on other jurisdictionally interested
states as well as the system generally. Under this approach the United
States should be able successively to prosecute bin Laden, and Chile
should be (or should have been) able successively to prosecute Pinochet.
At the same time, we can imagine situations where an exercise of
jurisdiction to prosecute successively might seem unreasonable. Suppose a
Turkish national is accused of sinking a Norwegian-flag cruise ship
docked in Turkish waters. Down with the ship goes the Norwegian crew as
well as one hundred passengers of different nationalities, including one
Brazilian, one Japanese and one U.S. citizen. Even if Turkey prosecutes
for the crime it might still seem reasonable for Norway to exercise
jurisdiction for successive prosecution purposes. The ship was "a floating
piece of Norway," creating a variation of territorial linkage in addition to
the national links Norway would have to the drowned crew members. But
what about Brazil, or Japan, or the United States? These countries may
well have national jurisdiction based on passive personality. 416 But their
connections to the crime are surely more attenuated than those of Norway.
Now, it may be perfectly reasonable for any of these three states to
prosecute if the defendant has not already been prosecuted by another
state. Even if only one of their nationals is killed that could create a strong
enough interest to see justice done to make prosecution reasonable under
international law. Where things might veer into the unreasonable,
however, is if the individual already has been prosecuted, and by those
states with the strongest links to the crime and in the best position to

416. See supranote 129.
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evaluate the case, including evidence and witness testimony. Indeed,
suppose Turkey and Norway both hold full and fair trials and each acquits
the accused finding the whole thing to be a case of mistaken identity. A
successive prosecution of this same individual by the United States
certainly would seem unreasonable to the defendant, perhaps other
interested states (most notably, Turkey and Norway), and the international
system at large because of the conflicting judgments and potential frictions
it might generate.
2. Universal JurisdictionApplication
Of course the international basis of jurisdiction with the least links to
the crime, and that therefore threatens to be the least reasonable, is
universal jurisdiction. But we already know that states with universal
jurisdiction laws actually engage in a type of reasonableness analysis by
giving primacy to national jurisdiction states and by refusing to prosecute
successively where the latter already have prosecuted in line with Rule
(3).417 The doctrinal soundness of this rule should now be plain.
If we can all agree that multiple prosecutions for the same crime
generally should be disfavored absent a competing reason, I will submit
without much more that where a state with national jurisdiction prosecutes
for an international crime, a state with only universal jurisdiction-that is,
a state with no connection at all to the crime-ought not to be able to
prosecute the same individual again for the same crime. Universal
jurisdiction's normative justification is protecting the interests of the
international legal system and of victims of grave international crimes
through decentralized enforcement of international law. 418 Where a state
with national jurisdiction already has prosecuted, the universal jurisdiction
state has no distinct national interest in prosecuting again, and the interests
of the international legal system (which underpin its universal jurisdiction
to begin with) already have been vindicated. A good faith prosecution by a
national jurisdiction state also vindicates the victims' interests to see
justice done. Indeed, a state with national or territorial links to universal
crimes likely is going to be in a better position to vindicate victims' rights
than a state with no links to the crimes since it is more likely that the
former also has stronger links to the victims. 4 19 Hence the reason for

417.

See supraPart IV.E.1.

418. See supraPart III.B and sources cited therein.
419. This is not to say that the universal jurisdiction state will have no link to the victims. Indeed,
it may have been the victims who initiated the proceedings or brought their claims to the state's
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giving priority to national jurisdiction states over universal jurisdiction
states.
We might work in an exception where the first prosecution is a sham
designed to insulate the accused, and as we saw, states already have
incorporated such an exception through principles of complementarity. 4
The burden of proving a sham is generally high under these principles, and
will mostly fall to the party seeking the exercise of universal
jurisdiction. 421 There is, naturally, always the chance that some court or
prosecutor will dub a good faith foreign trial a sham in order to make a
political point through a successive universal jurisdiction prosecution. But
for better or worse, universal jurisdiction is probably here to stay. The
challenge is to figure out how best to regulate its exercise. The very
existence of the limits identified by this Article's theory should assuage
those skeptical of universal jurisdiction. For the alternative would be that
any state that decides to pass a universal jurisdiction law might feel itself
free to prosecute anyone, anytime.
As it stands, the clear international legal trend is that a prosecution by a
state with national jurisdiction precludes a successive prosecution by a
state with only universal jurisdiction. In my view, this trend is
theoretically compelled. Added onto this first trend is another trend,
whereby states contemplating an exercise of universal jurisdiction give
primacy to states with national jurisdiction. The combination of these two
trends is the preclusion of universal jurisdiction prosecutions so long as
territorial or national states are able and willing to prosecute in good faith.
D. FurtherReducing Successive Prosecutions:Enforcement Comity
One big question remains: is there anything else in the U.S. and
international systems that might suppress multiple prosecutions by
different sovereigns whose exercise of jurisdiction is permissible-even
under our revised tests? Indeed, just because successive prosecutions by
different sovereigns are permitted does not mean that they are required.
Both U.S. constitutional and international law set baselines. In the double
jeopardy context both sets of laws as I have described them merely
provide that different sovereigns may prosecute successively for the same

attention for prosecution. See, e.g., Henry J. Steiner, Three Cheersfor UniversalJurisdiction Or Is It
Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 199, 214 (2004) (describing Rwandan victims bringing
proceedings in Belgium against Rwandans for crimes committed in Rwanda).
420. See supranotes 335-48.
421. See supranote 345.
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crime where they have independent jurisdiction, not that they must-or
that successive prosecutions are even a good idea. The law simply reserves
for sovereigns the power of successive prosecution should they choose to
exercise it. There may be very good political or policy reasons why they
might choose not to. And in fact, consideration of some of these reasons
has been systemically built into both U.S. and international law through
doctrines of comity.
Like other habitual terms unavoidably implicated by this Article's
423
argument, 422 "comity" carries with it a mess of definitional baggage.
Whatever else it may stand for, the common idea behind modern comity
doctrines seems to be that sovereigns should, and perhaps even have an
obligation to, consider the interests of other sovereigns when deciding
whether to exercise their own sovereign power; but that they are not
bound, in a legal sense, to defer to those foreign interests. 424 This is the
broad sense in which I want to use the term here.
We can think of comity as layering onto the "hard" legal baseline rules
of double jeopardy softer policy considerations of how other
jurisdictionally interested states (perhaps most particularly, states that
already have prosecuted) might view a successive prosecution; and thus,
as helping states contemplating successive prosecutions to internalize the
impact of their exercise of sovereign power before pursuing such
prosecutions. At the same time, because states are not bound to defer to
the foreign interests they consider, comity offers flexibility for politically
acceptable results.
Like the three types of jurisdiction outlined in Part I of this Articleprescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement-comity can be classified into
three types for the present double jeopardy discussion-prescriptive,
425
adjudicative, and enforcement.
Prescriptive comity implies a voluntary
legislative limitation upon the reach of a state's own laws out of deference
to foreign interests. Adjudicative comity is the decision by a state's courts
not to apply the state's laws out of deference to foreign interests. And
enforcement comity is the decision of the state's law-enforcer not to act

422. See, e.g., supra Parts II, III.A (discussing the problem of defining "sovereignty").
423. For a synopsis of the meanings courts and commentators have given to the term, see Joel R.
Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (1991). For a critique of U.S. courts

invoking comity without defining it, see Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "InternationalComity," 83
IOWA L. REv. 893 (1998).
424. An oft-quoted formulation of the doctrine comes from the Supreme Court. Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) ("'Comity' ... is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.").
425. Cf id.at164.
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out of deference to foreign interests. Of these, enforcement comity in
particular holds strong potential for accommodating the two competing
normative considerations highlighted above. After explaining why this is, I
will illustrate with real-world examples from the U.S. and international
systems.
A key advantage of enforcement comity is that it can facilitate strong
and elastic "networks" 426 among different sovereigns through their
national enforcement agencies. Through these networks, agencies can
represent their state's interests from the beginning of an investigatory or
prosecutorial effort by other states, thus lessening the need for, and
probability of, successive prosecutions.
Both adjudicative and prescriptive comity envisage domestic
governmental actors, whether courts or legislatures, acting in relative
isolation from foreign states when making their determinations about
whether to pursue successive prosecutions. In the adjudicative comity
scenario, the prosecution already has been brought, and the judge makes
the unilateral determination whether the prosecution comports with
whatever that judge's notions of comity might be. In the legislative comity
scenario, the legislature prescribes generally applicable rules governing all
cases going forward. Perhaps the legislature could communicate with
representatives of foreign states and take into account foreign interests in
this general ex ante lawmaking process, but it has no ordinary institutional
ability to change the rules based on contemporaneous communications
with other states for each successive prosecution case that happens to
arise.
By contrast, a state's enforcement agencies can communicate and
cooperate contemporaneously with other states from the outset of a
prosecutorial effort and leave open the communication and cooperation
channels throughout the prosecution. The more communication and
cooperation between enforcement agencies from the start, the higher the
likelihood that a single prosecution will vindicate the interests of those
agencies and the governments they represent, consequently lowering the
likelihood of successive prosecutions. This not only creates efficiencies
and eases friction for systems of multiple sovereigns, it also advances the
individual's interest not to be prosecuted multiple times.
A few examples illustrate how enforcement comity can, and does, work
in the both the U.S. and international systems: the U.S. Department of

426. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Jenia Jontcheva
Turner, TransnationalNetworks and InternationalCriminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985 (2007).
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Justice's Petite policy; the U.S.-E.C. Positive Comity Agreement; and
prior notice and consultation provisions in multilateral treaties covering
international crimes.
1. Enforcement Comity in the U.S. System: The Petite Policy
The U.S. Justice Department's Petite policy 427 builds an institutional
policy barrier against successive federal prosecution where the defendant
already has been tried in state court for the same criminal activity.42 8 The
federal prosecution must meet both substantive and procedural
prerequisites.
Substantively, "the matter must involve a substantial federal interest"
and "the prior prosecution must have left that ...interest demonstrably
unvindicated., 429 Determination of whether the matter involves a
substantial federal interest is "made on a case-by-case basis"; and
determination of whether the federal interest is left unvindicated is subject
to a presumption that the prior state prosecution-regardless of outcomeadequately vindicated the federal interest. 430 This presumption may be
defeated by exceptions for sham or incompetent trials or inadequate
sentences.431 It also may be overcome where "the alleged violation
involves a compelling federal interest, particularly one implicating an
enduring national priority" and "the alleged violation involves egregious
conduct ... or the impairment of the functioning of 432
an agency of the
federal government or the due administration of justice."
The Petite policy is, in sum, an advanced and formalized version of
enforcement comity as I have defined it above, here between the U.S.
federal and state governments. It represents an institutionalized policy
governing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that requires deference
to a prior state prosecution "even where a prior state prosecution would
not legally bar a subsequent federal prosecution under the Double
433
Jeopardy Clause because of the doctrine of dual sovereignty. "'
Yet the

427. The policy was named after Petite v. UnitedStates, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
428. "The policy applies whenever there has been a prior state or federal prosecution resulting in
an acquittal, a conviction, including one resulting from a plea agreement, or a dismissal or other
termination of the case on the merits after jeopardy has attached." DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.031(C) (Dual and Successive Prosecution Policy ("Petite Policy"))
[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL].
429. Id. § 9-2.031(D).

430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433.

Id. § 9-2.031(B).
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federal government retains its "sovereign" ability to overcome the
presumption where the prior state prosecution did not adequately vindicate
federal interests, either because the proceedings were faulty or their
outcome was unsatisfying or the federal interest in prosecution is just so
strong. 434 As the Second Circuit has explained, the Petite policy "is not a
limitation on the government's sovereign right to vindicate its interests
and values, and nothing prevents a federal prosecution whenever
the state
' 435
prosecution has not adequately protected the federal interest."
Additionally, as a procedural matter, "the [successive federal]
prosecution must be approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney
General., 436 This procedural requirement ensures accountability and "that
the power to bring dual prosecutions is exercised selectively and that the
substantive standards are carefully and consistently applied., 437 Moreover,
in line with the argument set forth above:
whenever a matter involves overlapping federal and state
jurisdiction, federal prosecutors should, as soon as possible, consult
with their state counterparts to determine the most appropriate
single forum in which to proceed to satisfy the substantial federal
and state interests involved, and,
if possible, to resolve all criminal
438
liability for the acts in question.
The overall purposes of the Petite policy therefore are to
institutionalize deference to prior prosecutions for the same activity by
other sovereigns but to retain the power to vindicate overriding federal
interests while protecting defendants from having to endure multiple
prosecutions unless those interests are compelling. 439 A final purpose that
helps achieve all of these other purposes is "to promote coordination and
cooperation between federal and state prosecutors." 440 According to Harry

434.
435.
436.
437.

Id. § 9-2.031(D).
United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990).
U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 428, § 9-2.031(A).
Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions:A Modelfor Concurrent Federal

Jurisdiction,543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sc'. 72, 76 (1996).

438. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 428, § 9-2.031(A).
439. Id.
440. Id. This is not to say that increased federal coordination and communication with state
government does not potentially give rise to other problems. See Michael M. O'Hear, National
Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures To Reduce Federal-State
Sentencing Disparities,87 IowA L. REv. 721, 760 (2002) (describing how federal commandeering of

state police through cooperative measures "obscures the boundaries of political responsibility and
accountability, undermines the confidence constituents have in their officials, and erodes the authority
of local and state institutions."). For example, cooperating prosecuting entities may use a first
prosecution as a dry run for a second, or may use the threat of prosecution by multiple sovereigns to
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Litman and Mark Greenberg, the Petite policy has limited successive
federal prosecutions to only "a minuscule fraction of the total number of
state prosecutions in which federal jurisdiction is available." 441 And the
American Bar Association found that because of the policy, "federal
reprosecutions for the same conduct are rare and are usually
undertaken to
442
vindicate interests most citizens would find compelling."
2. Enforcement Comity in the InternationalSystem
Enforcement comity in the international system can function much the
same way it does in the U.S. system. It offers a means through which
deference to foreign interests, communication, and cooperation may
accommodate the interests of different sovereigns while preserving
sovereignty and, as a practical matter, protect individuals from multiple
prosecutions. Although the substantive and procedural mechanisms of
enforcement comity in international relations might not be as advanced
and formalized as the Petite policy, the building blocks are there and the
seeds for future maturation have been sown.
a. U.S.-E. C. Positive Comity Agreement
In some areas of international regulation the movement toward more
formal avenues of enforcement comity has already begun to take hold
through agreements with fairly specific communication and coordination
rules. To take a well-known example, the so-called "Positive Comity"
Agreement between the European Communities and the United States
addresses
situations of potential concurrent jurisdiction over
anticompetitive activities taking place in the territory of one party but
adversely affecting interests of the other party. 443 Under the Agreement,
competition authorities of one party may request the competition
authorities of the other party to take enforcement action against

extract a more favorable plea bargain. Thus cooperation, especially unregulated cooperation, is not a
panacea. My point is only that for the purpose of reducing double jeopardy, ex ante cooperation can
help to ensure that a single prosecution fully vindicates the interests of all sovereigns, thereby
obviating the need for multiple prosecutions.
441. Litman & Greenberg, supranote 437, at 77-78.
442. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, FINAL REPORT OF AD Hoc
TASK FORCE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1994), reprinted in ADAM HARRIS KURLAND, SUCCESSWE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 378 (2001).

443. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European
Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their
Competition Laws, U.S.-E.C., June 4, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1070, 1070-75.
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anticompetitive activities taking place in the latter's territory but affecting
the interests of the former.444 A primary purpose of the agreement is to
"[e]stablish cooperative procedures to achieve
the most effective and
445
efficient enforcement of competition law."
Like the Petite policy, the Agreement creates a presumption that under
certain circumstances "[t]he competition authorities of a Requesting Party
will normally defer or suspend their own enforcement activities in favor of
enforcement activities by the competition authorities of the Requested
Party., 446 The presumption in favor of a single enforcement action is
triggered by the fulfillment of certain criteria.
First, the anticompetitive activities either do not have "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in the
Requesting Party's territory" 447 or "the anticompetitive activities do have

such an impact on the Requesting Party's consumers, [but] they occur
principally in and are directed principally towards the other Party's
territory." 448 In other words, a party's deferral or suspension of
enforcement action is presumed where the other party has clearly stronger
jurisdictional links to the activities in question. Next, "the adverse effects
on the interests of the Requesting Party can be and are likely to be fully
and adequately investigated and, as appropriate, eliminated or adequately
remedied pursuant to the laws, procedures, and available remedies of the
Requested Party.

449

Last are communication and cooperation provisions requiring that the
competition authorities of the Requested Party agree that in conducting
their enforcement activities they will: devote adequate resources to the
enforcement activities; 450 use best efforts to pursue all sources of
information, including those suggested by the Requesting Party; 451 inform,
and provide information to, the authorities of the Requesting Party on the
status of the enforcement activities; 452 "notify the ...authorities of the
Requesting Party of any change in their intentions with respect to
investigation or enforcement";453 and use best efforts to quickly pursue

444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.

III.
I.
IV(2).
IV(2)(a)(i).
IV(2)(a)(ii).
IV(2)(b).
IV(2)(c)(i).
IV(2)(c)(ii).
IV(2)(c)(iii).

453.

Id. art. IV(2)(c)(iv).
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completion of an investigation and to obtain remedies.454 The requested
party's authorities also must "fully inform" the requesting party's
authorities "of the results of their investigation and take into account the
views" of the requesting party's authorities "prior to ...

settlement,

initiation of proceedings, adoption of remedies, or termination of the
investigation" 455 as well as "comply with any reasonable request that may
be made" by the Requesting Party's authorities. 456 These communication
provisions clearly intend to see to it that the Requesting Party's interests
are satisfied by the Requested Party's enforcement action, thus disposing
of the need for multiple enforcement actions.
The Agreement also provides that "[t]he competition authorities of the
Requesting Party may defer or suspend their own enforcement activities if
fewer than all of the conditions set out" above are satisfied,457 but that
"[n]othing in this Agreement precludes the competition authorities of a
Requesting Party that choose to defer or suspend independent enforcement
activities from later initiating or reinstating such activities." 458 The
Requesting Party therefore may always decide to defer to the other party's
enforcement action-and there is a presumption that it will when the listed
criteria are present; but it still retains the sovereign power to pursue its
own action should it feel that its interests remain unsatisfied.
b. PriorNotice and ConsultationProvisions
The Petite policy and the U.S.-E.C. Positive Comity Agreement are
examples of relatively mature enforcement comity regimes with welldeveloped, formalized rules of communication and cooperation. Less welldeveloped are prior notice and coordination provisions, referenced
earlier,459 contained in multilateral treaties covering transnational and
international crimes. Yet these provisions contemplate precisely the same
sort of communication and cooperation opportunities among interested
states as the Petite policy and Positive Comity Agreement.
To take one notorious area of characteristically multi-jurisdictional
crime, the major anti-terrorism treaties of the past forty years uniformly
mandate prior notice to other jurisdictionally interested states. 460 The

454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Id. art. IV(2)(c)(v).
Id. art. IV(2)(c)(vi).
Id. art. IV(2)(c)(vii).
Id. art. IV(3).
Id. art. IV(4).
See supranote 356.
See Hijacking Convention, supra note 350, art. 6(4); Montreal Convention, supra note 350,
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treaties all contain similar, if not identical, provisions directing that any
state making a "preliminary inquiry" or "investigation" into the facts of an
offense set forth in the treaty "shall promptly report its findings to [other
directly jurisdictionally interested states as designated by the treaty, i.e.,
national jurisdiction 461
states] and shall indicate whether it intends to
exercise jurisdiction."
Coordination provisions additionally promote cooperation and ex ante
resolution of jurisdictional disputes. For example, along with its prior
notice provision, the Convention for the Suppression of Financing
Terrorism provides that "[w]hen more than one State Party claims
jurisdiction over the offences set forth [herein], the relevant States Parties
shall strive to coordinate their actions appropriately, in particular
concerning the conditions for prosecution and the modalities for mutual
legal assistance. 462 The Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime similarly directs "that [where] one or more other States Parties are
conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in respect
of the same conduct, the competent authorities of those States Parties
shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a view to coordinating their
actions. 463 This same provision applies to the Convention's three
Protocols regarding human and weapons trafficking. 464 And the Corruption
Convention contains an identical provision. 465 One result of these
communication and coordination obligations hopefully would be
agreement among interested states on a single forum for prosecution, and
the representation and vindication of those states' interests in that single
forum's prosecution.
Indeed, an even stronger prior consultation (compared to prior notice)
obligation explicitly geared toward arriving at a single forum for
prosecution has started to appear in conventions dealing with almost

art. 6(4); Hostage Convention, supra note 350, art. 6(6); Maritime Navigation Convention, supranote
350, art. 7(5); Bombing Convention, supra note 350, art. 7(6); Financing Convention, supra note 350,
art. 9(6); Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supranote 350, art. 10(6).
461. See supranote 460.
462. Financing Convention, supranote 350, art. 7(5).
463. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 15(5), G.A. Res.
55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000).
464. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking of Persons, Especially Women and
Children, art. 1(2), G.A. Res. 25, Annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/55/49
(Dec. 25, 2003); Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime, art. 1(2), G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex III, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Jan. 8, 2001); Protocol Against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, art. 1(2),
G.A. Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255 (July 3, 2005).
465. United Nations Convention against Corruption, supra note 350, art. 42(5).
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definitionally multi-jurisdictional activity. For example, Article 22 of the
Convention on Cybercrime states: "When more than one Party claims
jurisdiction over an alleged offence established in accordance with this
Convention, the Parties involved shall, where appropriate, consult with466
a
view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.,
Article 4 of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials
in International Business Transactions contains an identical
•• 467
provision.
Enforcement comity currently represents both a feasible and helpful
mechanism through which jurisdictionally interested states can reduce
successive prosecutions for multi-jurisdictional crimes. It preserves states'
sovereign flexibility to prosecute for acts seriously harming national
interests while easing friction and enhancing efficiency by inviting states
to internalize ex ante the effects of successive prosecutions on other states
and encouraging communication and cooperation from the outset of
investigatory and prosecutorial efforts. The result, beneficial to both
sovereigns and defendants, is a single enforcement action in a single
forum in which all relevant states' interests are represented.
CONCLUSION
Double jeopardy rules among sovereigns throw into sharp relief
fundamental tensions between some of our most basic legal intuitions
concerning individual rights and the very idea of sovereignty. And they do
so against a backdrop loaded with questions about the proper distribution
of power in two of the world's major legal systems. Resolution of these
tensions in a coherent and practical fashion poses a central challenge for
both U.S. and international law.
This Article has attempted to meet that challenge head on. It offers a
theory that not only explains an otherwise opaque domestic doctrine and
seemingly incoherent mix of international rules and practice, but also
recommends adjustments to each body of law that better accommodate the
competing interests at stake-including those of multiple sovereigns, the
systems they comprise, and those of individual defendants.

466. Convention on Cybererime, art. 22(5), Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185.
467. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, art. 4(3), Dec. 17, 1997, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, 37 I.L.M. 1.

